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Summary
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is among the first established quantum information
technologies (QIT) which are based on the laws of quantum mechanics. QKD allows the
generation of identical random numbers at two remote locations. These numbers are used
as keys to encrypt and decrypt communications between parties at those points. The
cryptographic key is generated by distributing quantum states between the two parties.
The quantum state is either sent through air in a free space channel, or through a fiber
optic cable. This technology requires optical hardware including linear optic elements, a
source of photons in a quantum state, and single photon detectors. This makes robust
implementations of QKD possible given current optical communication technologies, and
moreover, it is compatible with many current optical communications technologies.
The key generated via QKD satisfies a high level of cryptographic security, and under
certain assumptions is considered to be completely secure. By completely secure it is meant
that the two parties who wish to communicate in secret may infer that any eavesdropper
will have no knowledge of the final binary sequence they share. The final key is the result
of error correction and compression on the raw measurement results of the photons that
are distributed. The final key may then be used to establish secure communication using
a cryptographic communication protocol.
It has been shown that the security claims about QKD are stronger when a source of
entangled photons is used to distribute the key [1, 2]. Previously, an implementation of
such an entanglement-based QKD protocol distributed over a free space optical channel
has only been successful at night, since the key information is extracted from single
photons which are not easily distinguished from the large background of sunlight in the
channel during daytime. This limitation on the effective use of QKD resulted from the
difficulty of distinguishing daylight photon counts of the sun from the series of single
photons distributed for key generation.
This thesis presents the experimental set up, procedure, and data, resulting in the first
demonstration of an experimental quantum cryptographic protocol based on entangled
photon sources which operates in daylight conditions over a free space channel. An efficient
v
key exchange using a robust and portable entanglement-based QKD system, during both
day and night for a continuous 48 hour cycle, is presented. An average of 385 bits of
key per second are generated resulting in more than 65 Mbits of final key. We have thus
overcome the previous limitation of entanglement-based QKD to night time use. Over the
whole period the rate of detected pairs and background events varied by about 2 orders
of magnitude. A summary of this thesis may be found in the New Journal of Physics,
April 2009 special issue on Quantum Cryptography [3].
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1.1 Quantum Cryptography and Daylight Operation
of Quantum Key Distribution Systems
1.1.1 How to communicate securely using quantum bits
This section outlines quantum key distribution for cryptography, and its physical require-
ments. As well, we describe in simple terms why quantum key distribution is secure.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been demonstrated for practical use as a key
distribution protocol for cryptography, and is one of the original developments of an
information technology based on the laws of quantum physics. Quantum information
technology (QIT) has matured from the earliest conception which supposed quantum
principles, namely the superposition and uncertainty principles, would be a hindrance to
technical development and limit the growth of computing power predicted by Moore
in 1965 [4, 5]. But quantum physics was later shown to be have some advantages when
used for communication and computing through a variety of different implementations
[6, 7, 8, 9]. Such developments originated in the early 1970’s from Stephen Wiesner’s
original idea; that quantum particles embedded into bank notes would allow their unique
identification, thereby creating useful quantum money. The significance of the idea was
1
not well understood, and the idea remained unpublished until much later [10].
In 1984 the use of quantum systems for a cryptographic key exchange protocol known
as BB84 for the inventors Bennett and Brassard [11] attracted considerable interest
from scientists, and now quantum cryptographic systems are available in the market1.
QKD theoretically allows secure communication based on some principles of quantum
physics. The most simple explanation is based on the no-cloning theorem. The no-
cloning theorem is presented in greater detail in section 2.2. Here is the basic idea: Given
a single quantum particle with two possible (orthogonal) states denoted 0 or 1, we can
define a resource know as a Qubit written in the Dirac notation as
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, where α, β ∈ [0, 1] (1.1)
and 〈ψ|ψ〉 = α2 + β2 = 1, for normalization.
This describes a quantum particle which is in a superposition of two states; |0〉 and
|1〉 for a complex variable α and β. It was proved with the no-cloning theorem that this
quantum state cannot be copied in a single measurement [12].
Measurement of a qubit does not yield a value for the α or β in equation 1.1.1. The
measurement only reveals the result of the state; i.e either a |0〉 or |1〉 can be distin-
guished. Thus, it is not possible for an eavesdropper to recreated the state of the qubit
in equation 1.1.1 based on a single measurement. In respect to a hacking attempt, there
can be two cases when a single qubit is measured, either the measurement has destroyed
the particle or an imperfect replacement may be sent in it’s place by an eavesdropper.
Thus, a measurement on the qubit will either disturb or destroy the final qubit which
is distributed between the two parties for QKD. The result is that a hacking attempt
based on a measurement of the distributed qubit can be observed as an increasing error
ratio in the raw key bits that are distributed. Information leakage may be estimated by
monitoring the fraction of errors in the results between the two communicating parties.
To place a bound on the information an eavesdropper has of the final key, an error
threshold for the protocol must be maintained to conclude a third party has limited










Initial Key Initial Key
Free Space Channel
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Figure 1.1: Layout of the Quantum Key Distribution Experiment: Photon pairs are obtained from
an EPR source, and distributed to two parties. Those parties measure the polarization of each photon
and attach to each result a time tag for processing. The resulting raw key information is input to the
error correction algorithm, which yields the error ratio known as the Quantum Bit Error Ratio (QBER)
and an initial key. This requires some public discussion leading to some leakage of information to an
eavesdropper. The QBER is used to decide upon the amount of compression required in the Privacy
Amplification stage which outputs a final key. The final key may be used to encrypt or decrypt public
communications. Dual solid lines represent transmission of classical information, while the single solid
line represents quantum information.
information of the key. This requires that the information shared between the two parties
is compressed in a post processing procedure called privacy amplification (PA) by an
amount depending on the error ratio. Note, this occurs after error correction (EC) is
applied to the raw key generated from measurements on a series of qubits. The parties
may then use their keys to encrypt and decrypt their plaintext and create a secret cipher
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which can be communicated publicly in a symmetric2 key protocol over a classical channel
between them. Only the key which they hold may be used to decrypt that cipher and
reveal the plaintext. It should be pointed out that the most secure way to use the key is
as a one-time-pad3[13] where it is applied once with no repetition, and then disposed of.
Otherwise an eavesdropper may compare segments of the cipher to decode the key itself,
and access the plaintext.
In quantum cryptography, photons provide the physical basis for encoding the key
bit since they may be transmitted over long distances without interacting strongly with
the medium of the channel. The transmission is either sent through fiber optic cables,
or simple sent through air in a collimated light beam4 to be coupled into a detecting
telescope. This later transmission method is known as free space optical communication
and is applied in this experiment. It has the added advantage that the channel between
two remote points may be established ad hoc with the only requirement that there is no
obstruction in the channel.
The degrees of freedom of a photon including the polarization, detection time, spec-
trum, or spatial location may all be used to define the qubit, but the most natural choice
for a free space based experiment is the polarization of the photon. We can then write
our qubits in equation 1.1.1 from here on as
α|H〉+ β|V 〉 (1.2)
where H and V are the horizontal and vertical polarization states respectively and nor-
malization is ignored. This choice arises since air has negligible birefringence, and will
therefore not cause uncertain rotations in the polarization based on the trajectory the
photon travels.
Up to this point we have seen that quantum states used to distribute a cryptographic
2As opposed to asymmetric cryptography such as an RSA protocol where parties use different keys
for key distribution.
3Also known as the Vernam cipher. This limits the plaintext to a block which is equivalent in size
with the key.
4In the literature, a collimated beam is often referred to as a tight light beam in the context of
atmospheric turbulence.
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key between two remote locations provides a solution to the problem of secure key dis-
tribution. Succinctly, any measurement of the photons in the transmission channel will
influence the result at the end of the channel. As well, we have introduced the physical
means by which we intend to prepare and distribute a quantum state for QKD. Now we
can look at a basic arrangement for the experiment. Referring to figure 1.1, observers at
points A and B (typically observed by the two parties Alice and Bob, respectively) want
to communicate a secret message. They have a quantum channel and a classical channel.
The basic processing of the data is outlined in a flow diagram and finally the process by
which they can perform cryptographic communication is shown. A good review of QKD
is by Gisin in [13].
1.1.2 A closer look at quantum security
We have a basic outline of the QKD experiment. Now we outline some different protocols
for QKD and discuss the security in more detail, which leads us to understand why an
entanglement source is used for this experiment.
There are a number of different quantum cryptographic protocols, and we will discuss
three protocols: the BB84, BBM92, and E91 protocols. The BB84 protocol [11] of
Bennett and Brassard is the first design, relying on the preparation of a qubit in
a single photon. The single photon is actively prepared in one of two possible bases.
An eavesdropper cannot find a simple measurement technique to distinguish |H〉 or |V 〉
single photon states from diagonal ones. Although the orthogonal states |H〉 and |V 〉 are
defined in reference to a measurement basis, the measurement results in one basis, chosen
for example with respect to the gravitational field, will be different from measurement
results in a basis rotated by 45◦ to that vertical measurement basis. Alice uses a random
number to select the basis, and Alice and Bob will keep the measurement results in which
Bob happens to choose the correct basis by comparing the basis results publically. Doing
this does not disclose their measurement results to Eve and is thus secure.
Another protocol named BBM92 developed by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin
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[14] replaces the choice of basis at the prepare portion of the BB84 protocol with a passive
measurement apparatus which measures in two different basis randomly, while the qubit
is now replaced with an entangled photon pair. The basis choice can be done by including
a passive optical element in the detection unit which splits the photon into two paths.
The measurement basis is chosen randomly by including a polarization rotation in one
path so that for example, the photon traveling in one path is measured with respect to the
gravitational field, and the photon in the other path is measured in a basis again rotated
by 45◦ to be orthogonal to the first. The use of EPR pairs ensures that correlations among
the detection events will result, so that a key can be generated
The BBM92 protocol comments on another paper by Ekert published in 1991 [15]
which describes another protocol for QKD, called E91. This E91 protocol obtains it’s
security based on a measurement of entanglement. The development of the role of entan-
glement in these protocols is important to understand the motivation of this experiment.
The E91 version of the experiment was based on Bell states which serve to replace the
channel of BB84 with an EPR pair [16]. Alice and Bob would observe correlations from
this EPR pair to extract their key. With the two qubits in a maximally entangled singlet
state of the polarization
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉) , (1.3)
the two can test the correlation of the state to rule out the eavesdropper. This is because
the correlations in the state could not be predicted by a hypothetical Eve, unless you are
to accept that some hidden variable exists allowing the hacker to control the EPR correla-
tions. That is to say, if an eavesdropper has a-priori knowledge of the EPR correlations,
then this would mean there exists a hidden variable. This hidden variable was originally
ruled out by the violation of Bell’s inequalities [17, 18] experimentally by Aspect in the
early 1980’s [19, 20]. In the E91 protocol, it is this violation that must be measured to
gain cryptographic security.
However, it was argued in the formulation of the BBM92 protocol that the E91 security
6
claim was equivalent to this newly proposed protocol, as well as BB84. This was argued
by considering the two particles of the EPR pair traveling in different trajectories, both
to and from the EPR source so that the EPR pairs were deemed unnecessary [15]. The
choice of photon source for some time was ignored, and an approximation to a single
photon source was employed for QKD. Using an attenuated laser5 with a mean photon
number µ ≈ 0.1, a single photon state can be obtained, albeit imperfectly. High repetition
pulses, when comparing the emission rate of entanglement based sources, can be prepared
from an attenuated laser; hence the popularity of this light source. Thus, prepare-and-
send (PnS) methods based on the BB84 protocol use coherent pulses, whereby Alice
generates an imperfect single photon and prepares it in a particular state, then uses a
random number generator to actively prepare the state in a basis.
However, the question remained if quantum cryptography was really secure by encod-
ing qubits in highly attenuated laser pulses. Alice can not know how many photons are
within each pulse she encodes, due to the nature of the coherent photon state. Such states
obey a Poissonian probability statistic




in the photon number state |n〉6 for a mean photon number µ. There is always some
probability P2 ≈ µ2/2 of a two photon emission occurring. Alice may unknowingly send a
pulse containing two photons in a key bit to Bob. Even when Bob receives one photon, Eve
may have gained information of their qubit using the Photon Number Splitting Attack7
(PNS) leaving no evidence of her presence. Further discussion of realistic photon sources
in QKD revealed flaws in the security assumptions [22]. However, it was eventually
discovered that secure exchange using the coherent state as an approximation to a single
photon is possible by using decoy pulses [23].
5Which gives a faint coherent pulse: a superposition of photon number states
6Also known as a Fock state.
7This attack simply describes the case where Eve measures one of the two photons, which will be in
an identical state to the other. The second photon is still distributed for key generation, leaving no trace
of an error.
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While the security proofs on the coherent state protocols were developed, others raised
the issue of the equivalence of the E91 and BB84 type protocols. In particular it was
noticed that the assumptions in previous security proofs about the size of the Hilbert
space of the photon are not always justified. This is because two polarizations may be
distinguished by another variable, the spectrum of the photons for example, or possibly by
the timing of the two polarizations. This higher dimension of the Hilbert space meant that
a hacker could use the second degree of freedom as a side-channel [24, 25] to distinguish
the outcome of a key bit without disturbing the quantum state.
Considering a higher dimensional Hilbert space, security in a scenario where practical
devices cannot be trusted [1, 26] suggests the E91 entanglement based protocol obtains
greater security than protocols relying on a measurement of the error ratio. Moreover,
using a measure of entanglement to test security offers simplicity as it uses a single pa-
rameter; the Bell violation, while the other protocols may actually need to monitor a
large number of side-channels for errors. Such flaws in the basic assumptions of the un-
conditional security proofs for QKD point out the advantage of using entangled photon
sources in quantum cryptographic protocols. The first experimental version of an E91
protocol, where a violation of a Bell inequality was used as a measure of secrecy, was
performed by Alexander Ling and others in our lab in 2008 [2]. The key generated
in this experiment is presented in figure 1.2 where it can be seen that a measurement
monitors the Bell inequality for violation, and verifies the security of the key exchange.
All of the experimental free-space protocols which use entangled photon pairs to dis-
tribute the key have so far been implemented at night [27, 28, 29, 2, 30], because daytime
atmospheric light coupled in the measurement devices contributes too much background
light to allow secure key generation. The background would either saturate the detectors
into an unsafe operating regime, or contribute strongly to errors in the key. This prob-
lem can be seen in our Bell measurement experiment in figure 1.2 and places an obvious
limitation on free space QKD’s practical use. Yet this problem may not be impossible
to overcome. Daylight versions of QKD using faint coherent pulses have been successful
[31, 32], but here the bandwidth of the signal photons may be tightly controlled so that
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interference filters may be matched spectrally at the receiver. Yet, the advantages of us-
ing entanglement based QKD systems is apparent. Thus, further techniques for filtering
background light coupled in the free space channel during daytime must be explored for
entanglement based quantum key distribution protocols. This is the motivation of the
following experiment.
As a final point on security, it should always be assumed that the eavesdropper has
no access to the remote locations A and B. Otherwise, she can simply observe the devel-
opment of a cipher and would not be detected as an increasing error ratio. As a more
sophisticated point, any compromising emanations of the hardware can be considered as
access to the lab. For example, a distinguishing electrical signal radiating from the detec-
tors and escaping the lab would be information available revealing which detection event
occurred. Other forms of leakage include a flash from the breakdown of an avalanche
photo detector, electrical waves correlated to the QKD device through a room power out-
let, acoustic noise, radio frequency emanations, and more. Studies of such information
leakage are attempted, for example, in the TEMPEST project8. As well, we must as-
sume the system should behave as an unbiased random number generator, otherwise an
eavesdropper can use knowledge about the generator and obtain a larger probability of
extracting the key. This assumption must be tested empirically, and is discussed further


















































Figure 1.2: QKD based on a Bell test: A Bell violation (panel c) is monitored while key (panel d) is
generated. Note that the key exchange breaks down at sunrise, as we see the error (panel b) jump and
the key rate (panel d) drop dramatically at the right of the graph during sunrise. At this time no more





A brief description of entanglement.
Entanglement is arguably one of the most interesting properties of physics today. An
example of an entangled state is
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉A|V 〉B + eıθ|V 〉A|H〉B) ≡ 1√
2
(|HV 〉AB + eıθ|V H〉AB) (2.1)
with θ the phase difference between the |HV 〉 and |V H〉 states. The subscripts mean
that measurement is performed at two distinguishable systems A or B, usually a spatial
variable. Here, ignoring the phase term θ, either at location A, H is measured, and
at location B, V is measured, or vice-versa. Loosly speaking, entangled systems are
correlated in this way, with the measurements at the points A and B resulting in opposite
results, for example. More formally, an entangled system is defined as one in which the
state cannot be written as a product of states, or |ψ〉 6= |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉. More information
may be found through reference [33] at the section 8.1.2 Seperability and Entanglement.








(|01〉 ± |10〉) , (2.3)
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where Ψ− is the singlet state which is used for our polarization entanglement source in
this experiment. This state is antisymmetric with respect to exchanging the two systems
A and B. An entangled state cannot be separated into two distinct parts, but is intuitively
a single state of its own, albeit describing two particles which may be distinguished by
their locations in space (i.e. at A or B). The entangled state exhibits quantum (i.e.
non-classical) correlations upon measurement, also known as EPR correlations.
Correlations of an appropriately prepared system arise from quantum entanglement,
which predicts that an entangled particle cannot be described without reference to its
counterpart particle. To form a pair of quantum entangled bits usually the two bits must
originate from the same source, or interact somehow. The correlations resulting from
entanglement provide a resource for key distribution, since an appropriate measurement
of an entangled state will yield the same result, opposite result, or otherwise predictable
result between the entangled particles. Thus, a shared key will be obtained by both
parties measuring the state. A good introduction to entanglement is in [33, 34].
2.2 The No-Cloning Theorem
The no-cloning theorem is discussed and the proof is shown.
The no-cloning theorem [12] is a simple example illustrating some of the profound
differences between quantum and classical physics. It states that, given a general quantum
state such as that of equation 1.1.1, that state cannot be copied unless the basis to measure
the state in is known. This results from the superposition principle where the quantum
state probabilistically collapses into a possible measurement result, but it is debatable
if they exist as a superposition of those states prior to actual detection. This idea has
opened the door for quantum communication. A review of the subject can be found in
the paper by Valerio Scarani, Antonio Acin et al, in reference [35].
Here we outline the proof of the no-cloning theorem: Consider two general states, φ
and ψ, and an ancilla state S which is used to store the copy. Performing a generalized
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unitary operation U on the two states we obtain a set of two equations:
|φ〉A ⊗ |S〉B U→ |φ〉A ⊗ |φ〉B,
and
|ψ〉A ⊗ |S〉B U→ |ψ〉A ⊗ |ψ〉B.
Now taking the inner product of these two equations we have LHS = 〈s|s〉 ⊗ 〈ψ|φ〉 =
1⊗ 〈ψ|φ〉 = RHS = 〈ψ|φ〉2, and writing x = 〈ψ|φ〉 we have
x = x2 → x = {0, 1} . (2.4)
The two solutions for the cloning equation imply that either the states ψ and φ are in
fact equal (i.e. 〈ψ|φ〉 = 1) or are orthogonal (i.e. 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0) to each other, which means
that a quantum state can be copied if the measurement basis is known, but in general
the resulting equation is a contradiction. Thus, it is not possible to copy an unknown
quantum state using the generalized unitary operator.
Another way to illustrate the inability to obtaining a copy of a qubit, is by considering
the expansion of two qubits in a superposition of states |0〉 and |1〉1 You may imagine one
is the real state, while the other bit should be the resulting copy.
(|0〉+ |1〉)A ⊗ (|0〉+ |1〉)B = |00〉AB + |01〉AB + |10〉AB + |11〉AB (2.5)
= |0〉A (|0〉+ |1〉)B + |1〉A (|0〉+ |1〉)B (2.6)
6= |00〉AB + |11〉AB (2.7)
The final inequality is the case required for identical bits of the superposition of states
to result upon measurement. In the second line of the equation we can see that a mea-
surement applied to the first bit in attempt to gather information about the second bit
will obtain an uncertain result (|0〉+ |1〉)B for either case |0〉A or |1〉A. In fact, we see in
the second line that the measurement of the second bit is just the original superposition
and has no relation to the result of the first bit in a product of superpositions. The
state that would be required in the last inequality 2.7 is in fact an entangled state [18] or
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair.
1Normalization terms are ignored here.
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2.3 Basis of Security of QKD
Previously it was shown that the security of QKD requires monitoring of a error ratio
in the distributed key. Here a illustration of the security proofs is presented to yield a
threshold value for the QBER.
The security of a QKD scheme is based on an evaluation of the information shared
between Alice and Bob, and that accessible to an eavesdropper, to form a bound on the
information leakage to an eavesdropper. The information between both parties can be
represented by the Shannon information I (A,B) between the two parties Alice (A) and
Bob (B) [36, 37]. We will denote Alice and Bob as usual here, and let Eve be denoted by
(E) so her mutual information with Alice is I (A,E). For secure communication Alice and
Bob should observe a low mutual information entropy, while Eve’s goal is to decrease her
mutual information entropy between either Alice or Bob. If Eve decreases her information
entropy between Alice or Bob, then Alice and Bob will observe an increase in the entropy
of their sequences, showing up as an increasing error ratio in the correlated key. This is
because Eve’s gain will disturb or destroy the state, and she cannot recreate the state of
the original quantum bit to hide her hacking attempt, as suggested by the discussion of
the no-cloning theorem above.
The secrecy S (A,B|E) obtained by Alice and Bob against Eve is represented by the
inequality
S (A,B|E) ≥ max {I (A,B)− I (A,E) , I (A,B)− I (B,E)} (2.8)
which requires intuitively that Alice and Bob share more information than the increase in
information that Eve may obtain by eavesdropping on their communications. That error
ratio represents the amount of errors added into the key by a hypothetical eavesdropping
attempt and can be taken directly from the error correction (EC) algorithm.
Security proofs for QKD form an extremely active field of research. We will not go
into the details of the proofs which usually make assumptions so as to prove unconditional
security. The bounds found are as follows: Gisin et al calculate the maximum information
14




































Gisin et al bound (2002)
H(p) Binary Entropy
I(A,B) Alice and Bob’s Mutual Information
p<14.6%p<11%
S = I(A,B) − I(A,E)
Figure 2.1: Mutual Information and the Information Entropy Function with Respect to the Quantum
Bit Error Ratio. The blue trace represents the mutual information shared by Alice and Bob, while the
orange trace is the threshold for I(A,B) from the Shor Preskill security proof. The red trace is the
standard bound by Gisin[14]. Where these lines cross the secrecy obtained by the two parties goes to
zero. The green trace is the Shannon information entropy function.
Eve obtains in relation to the errors as I(A,E) ≈ 2
2ln(p)
p, to first order. This curve is





≈ 14.6%. In this scenario it was assumed Eve individually measures a photon
and hacks the channel one bit at a time. In a coherent attack Eve collects a large number
of photons and can manipulate them to hack the communication. This case was explored
in a number of papers [38, 39] and has been improved on by Shor and Preskill [40], who’s
security bound is the one accepted in our experimental protocol. They find the bound at
plog2 (p) + (1− p) log2 (1− p) ≤ 1/2. This bound is also plotted in figure 2.1.
The information leakage is quantified by the binary entropy function to the error rate
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as
H (p) = −p log2 (p)− (1− p) log2 (1− p) (2.9)
where p is the error ratio which is observed, or p = QBER. In figure 2.1 we can see that
the secrecy goes to zero near QBER = 11% at the point where Eve’s information becomes
greater than Alice and Bob’s information. Eve’s information here is presented assuming
I (A,E) is the maximal information Eve gained. The information she has accounts for
both the public information discussed by Alice and Bob, as well as the information she
has gained by eavesdropping which added errors to the key, while Alice and Bob share the
mutual information 1−H (p). For further information on the security proofs for quantum
key distribution an excellent article would be the summary by Valerio Scarani [41],
or the Ph.D. thesis of Rennato Renner on the security of quantum information [42].
For a more sophistocated version of a security proof for QKD refer to the Shor-Preskill
proof for the BB84 protocol [40].
2.4 Visibility as a Measure of Entanglement
To measure entanglement quality the visibility is used. This measurement is described here.
The quality of an entanglement source is typically measured by what is known of as
the visibility or visibility of quantum entanglement. This quantity is computed by the
function
V = (rmax − rmin) / (rmax + rmin) (2.10)
where rmax and rmin are the maximum and minimum number of correlation counts in the
sinusoidal fringe resulting from the following measurement:
1. entangled photon pairs are measured where one photon is coupled into a detector
through a polarization analyzer, thus measuring it in a particular polarization state.
2. In the detection on the corresponding photon, the state is measured through a
number of different polarization states.
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3. A sinusoidal curve resulting from quantum interference of the outcomes is recorded
from which the Visibility may be calculated from the count rates.
Note, the basis in which this measurement is relevant is formed by the setting of the first
polarization analyzer that is fixed in respect to the crystal axis. We test two bases, the HV
basis and ±45◦ basis, to find the corresponding visibilities VHV and V±45◦ , respectively.
Ideally, the minimum of the fringe rmin will be zero, but in practice there is usually
some noise in the detector and errors in the generation of the entangled pairs. The
resulting interference gives a measure of the quantum correlation present in the source
of entanglement with the actual detectors used, and thus can be used as one measure of
entanglement quality.
2.5 The BBM92 protocol
The protocol known as BBM92 is used in this experiment. This protocol uses the entangled
photon source, and it is described in detail in this section. The measurement apparatus
for the protocol is also presented.
In the BBM92 protocol, the measurement is performed in two bases randomly. The
basis is selected probabilistically by a simple linear optic 50/50 beam splitter at the input
port of the analyzer, and means that an eavesdropper will not be able to know the correct
basis in which to measure a particular bit. One basis would be |0〉 and |1〉 and the other
rotated by 45◦ to this basis. The layout of a BBM92 detector is in figure 2.2. The two
parties use an entangled state, but do not monitor a Bell violation. They compare the
independent measurement basis and remove all the bits which correspond to measurements
done in two different bases, known as sifting. Half the time their measurements should
be in the same basis so they get roughly rinitial ≈ 12rc from the rate rc of correlations
observed.
They now remove as well any events where no detection occurred. The remaining bits















Figure 2.2: The detector layout for measuring the polarization state of the qubit at both A and B.
The information enters in a quantum state which is a superposition of the possible states, and the
measurement result cannot be determined. It is measured in one of the bases with a 50/50 percent
probability, and is analyzed at the optical element labeled A. This is a polarizing beam splitter. Note,
the detector includes a wave plate which rotates the quantum bits into the ±45◦ basis in the lower
measurement mode labeled 45 basis. Upon detection the quantum state collapses at both Alice and Bob
and the bits become classical information. When the measurement basis at both sides is the same, the
bits will be the same value. In our case the singlet state which is anti-correlated, is used, so the bit is
anti-symmetric upon measurement before it is processed to a final key.
to imperfections, or eavesdropping attempts. They perform error correction on the keys
and find the error ratio. Then, the key is compressed by a ratio to satisfy the security
conditions. The BBM92 protocol allows more key to be exchanged in comparison to the
E91 version which requires measurement of an inequality. It however will not have the
same repetition rates of a BB84 protocol which can use a weak single photon source.
BBM92 does require the EPR pair as a source of light so will be an ideal protocol for our
daylight test. The BBM92 detection apparatus can be used to monitor the Bell inequality
with a simple modification of the detectors [2].
18
2.6 The Quantum Bit Error Ratio in Daylight
Given that we want to run this experiment during day, we must consider the errors which
will be contributed to the key by the background light. We present the theory here to cal-
culate the quantum bit error ratio (QBER) accounting for daylight background counts.
Measurement of the Quantum Bit Error Ratio (QBER) is of primary importance for
QKD. The QBER is the ratio of erroneous bits to total bits left in the sifted key, and gives
a value which places a bound on the information which could be due to eavesdropping
attempts. The increase in background levels means that correlated events due to detection
of sunlight coinciding with a real detection of the source will begin to contribute to the
generation of key bits. Since these correlations will increase the QBER these increasing
errors must be maintained below certain levels imposed by the security threshold.
Assume that the detector at Bob’s side is exposed to sunlight, while Alice’s detector
is embedded directly on the source, so does not detect the background light from the
sun. The high background level will lead to detection events which are mistaken with the
detection of a photon pair. These are uncorrelated to the single photon source in their
polarization and lead to an increase in the QBER, which is used to establish a bound for
the knowledge of an eavesdropper. The QBER will tend to 50% as the background level
rises, because an event at Alice’s detector recorded along with an unpolarized photon
from the sun on Bob’s detector will match in polarization only half the time.
In the following, we estimate the operational limit for generating a useful key under
such conditions, assuming the implementation of a symmetrical BBM92 protocol, where
both complementary measurement bases are chosen with an equal probability at the beam
splitter. The rate of correlations for two random signals is
r = S1 × S2 × τc, (2.11)
where S1 and S2 are uncorrelated detection rates and τc is the time window of observation.
Since the source includes actual correlated events, we must remove those rates from the
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uncorrelated rate for estimating the effect of the added background. Assuming that all
quoted rates already include detector efficiencies, we can characterize a pair source by its
single event rates, r1, r2, and its coincidence rate rc. We denote the transmission of the
entire optical channel2 as ηt.
Letting S1 be at Alice’s side and directly connected to the source, while S2 is at Bob’s
detector and exposed to the background in the free-space channel we have
S1 = r1 − ηtrc + rdc1,
and
S2 = rbg + ηt(r2 − rc) + rdc2
where rdci is the dark count rate at i = {1, 2}. An imbalance in counts over the four
detectors, which may arise due to unequal quantum efficiencies of the detector diode or
imperfections in the optical elements, would give rise to effects potentially exploitable
for hacking the key, in the form of bit patterns in the key. This will be tested in the
section 4.3. We use the average to approximate rdc1 = rdc2 = rdc ∼= 2000− 3000/s for our
detector. In what follows, the averaged effect of dark counts may be simply added to the
total QBER so that the minimum QBER does not quite reach the intrinsic QBER from
the source.
The signal or raw key rate for a symmetric BBM92 protocol is given by half of the





Let rbg be an external background event rate depending on the inclination of the sun, ori-
entation of the optical channel, and spectral bandwidth being measured. Assuming there
are no correlations between the source and background events, the accidental coincidence
rate with matching bases by substitution into equation 2.11 is then given by
2This includes absorptive losses in optical components (including a large loss of about 50% from the
interference filter) and air, geometrical losses due to imperfect mode transfer from an optical fiber, and





(r1 − ηtrc + rdc) (rbg + ηt(r2 − rc) + rdc) τc , (2.13)
where only one of the detectors, here with index 2, is exposed to the background events.
Imperfections in practical entangled photon pair sources, and detector projection er-
rors, are often characterized by visibilities of polarization correlations VHV and V±45◦ .
This gives rise to the intrinsic QBER qi of the QKD source
3. With a symmetric usage of









The total QBER qt of the complete ensemble is given by the weighted average over both











qircηt + (r1 − ηtrc + rdc) (rbg + ηt(r2 − rc) + rdc) τc/2
rcηt + (r1 − ηtrc + rdc) (rbg + ηt(r2 − rc) + rdc) τc . (2.15)
Note that as ηt → 0, qt → 12 , and likewise, as rbg >> ηtrc, again qt → 12 as expected.
In figure 2.3, note that for large values of ηt, a nearly flat plateau lies inside the secure
region of qt < 11%. This emphasizes that a strong signal coupling, along with a linear
reduction of the background rate are the main requirements for secure key generation,
and may allow daylight operation in intense light. In practice, if rbg >> ηtrc detector
saturation and damage would become an issue much before the asymptotic limit of qt.
Below the regime of detector damage, saturation of detectors still leads to a reduced
probability of detecting photons at high light levels. This effect can usually be modeled by
a dead time τd or recovery time for the device due to the finite time required to recharge
the capacitance of the APD. For passively quenched APDs’, this time is about 1µs, and
may be over an order of magnitude smaller for actively quenched devices. This gives a
useful estimation of the fraction of time a detector can register photo events. Given an
3This was measured in the lab to be 4.3% prior to running the experiment. Since the experiment
ran for some time, this was periodically tested during source maintenance, and usually fell in a range of





























Figure 2.3: Total QBER Dependence on Background Levels and Signal Transmission. The contours
(lower lines) show a linear dependence between the background rate and signal transmission for a given
QBER. Notice that in the condition of a large background rate and small signal transmission, the
error ratio goes toward the expected value of 1/2. The contour at the security threshold is marked
with the thick line. Some typical parameters in our experiment used here are (r′1=78 kcps, r
′
2=71 kcps,
r′c=11 kcps, τd = 1µs, T=15%, qi=4.3%, τc=2 ns).
initial photo event rate r (i.e., the rate a detector with no recovery time would report), a
detector with dead time τd will register a rate of
r′ = r(1− r′τd) or r′ = r 1
1 + rτd
. (2.16)
The detector saturation modifies both signal and accidental rates similarly to equation
2.16 by the same dead time correction factor α, where we assume an equal distribution
of photo events over all four detectors, resulting in a dead time constant of τd/4:
α =
1
1 + (rbg + r2ηt)τd/4
. (2.17)
22
Therefore, the resulting QBER qt in equation (2.15) does not get affected. However, the
signal rate does, leading to the modified expression
r′sig = αrsig =
rcηt/2
1 + (rbg + r2ηt)τd/4
. (2.18)
Above a certain background rate, qt exceeds the limit of 11% for which a secret key
can be established for individual attack schemes. If both detectors are exposed to the
large background of the sun it can be seen that the QBER of the key will be to large for
secure transmission at much lower background levels since correlations of sunlight counts
contribute much more strongly over both detectors. The case where both detectors may
see background rates, as in the dual link set up [29] is plotted in figure 2.4 for comparison.
Thus for such an experimental setup, stronger filtering should be applied.
It is instructive to consider the excess QBER due to background events:
∆q = qt − qi = (r1 − ηtrc) rbgτc 1/2− qi
rcηt + r1rbgτc
. (2.19)
In a parameter regime useful for key generation, qi  1/2, rsig  ra, and for simplicity




The source property rc/r1 is the efficiency of the source. Optimization of this parameter
is active research and it is set at it’s maximum value of rc/r1 ≈ 0.16. As well, the channel
transmission ηt, though requiring stabilization throughout the period of data acquisition,
was quite good, and maximized as much as possible. The only way to reduce the excess
error ∆q is to reduce the background rate rbg and the coincidence time window τc, while
increasing the signal transmission ηt. The limitation on reducing τc is the timing jitter
of all detectors, which in our case is on the order of a nanosecond. Emphasis thus has to
be drawn to reduce the background rate rbg and is discussed in the experimental section






























Figure 2.4: The total QBER dependent on background counts at either detector, using ηt = 15%, an
average value for the experiment. As compared to the case of an embedded detector in figure 2.3, having
both detectors exposed to the background counts of the sun will require further filtering to maintain an
appropriate bit ratio. Here the QBER rises approxiately with the square of the background level as the
coincide at two detectors.
2.7 Generation of Correlated Photon Pairs
The generation of an entangled pair requires the creation of photon pairs, and is usually
performed through a process called Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC).
We outline the theory of the most common method of obtaining these states here; by using
nonlinear optical crystals, which require optical wave mixing in a nonlinear medium.
In the discussion this far it has been assumed that it is possible to obtain entangled
photons without going into details about the physical preparation of such states. It is
possible to obtain bright sources of entangled photons coupled into single mode fibers for
ease of use.
Specifically the process known as parametric down-conversion is used to create two
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photons in a spatial mode which may be collected into single mode fibers. To describe it
simply, a pump photon in the nonlinear crystal may spontaneously split into two daughter
photons, and the photon pairs may be used to create entangled pairs. In what follows, the
two daughter photons are know as the signal and idler waves, or modes, which correspond
to two axes of the crystal. The pump is simply referred to as the pump wavelength or
mode, and the nonlinear medium is the optical crystal.
To generate photons using a continuous wave (cw) laser pumping the non-linear
medium we rely on vacuum fluctuations, and thus the photon pair is output randomly in
time, so that the resulting daughter photons emerge in a Poissonian temporal distribu-
tion. Down-conversion is the χ(2) three wave mixing process by interaction in a nonlinear
medium, where the nonlinear medium is left unchanged. This process can be described




χ(2)Ê(+)p (~r, t) Ê
(−)
s (~r, t) Ê
(−)
i (~r, t) dV +H.c. (2.21)




j (~r, t) for j = p, s, i include
creation and annihilation components which represents difference frequency generation,
and in the spacial case that ωs = ωi we get frequency degenerate down-conversion. The
inverse process is up-conversion (sum frequency generation) represented by the Hermitian
conjugate H.c., which we will ignore since we are sending pump light into the crystal for
creation of lower energy pairs.
The time dependence of the state can be considered to first order by Taylor expansion.
Reduction of the general time dependent Hamiltonian to the first order form gives

























where |ψ (0)〉 = |ψo〉, is the vacuum state, assuming on the right hand side of the equation
that there are no daughter photons before the pump is switched on. Higher order terms
represent higher energy processes, for example the 2nd order term is the interaction of two
pump photons splitting into four daughter photons, etc. These higher order terms would
result from further expansion of the left hand side of equation 2.22 due to the exponential
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function, but are ignored since the cw pump we used is not of sufficient intensity to
generate many four photon events. Since the generation rate of signal and idler photons
is small compared to the pump, it may be assumed that they do not re-enter the crystal
at any time t and stimulate the inverse process, up-conversion.
Ignoring the quantum state of the pump since the loss of a photon within a large
electro-magnetic field is negligible, the annihilation operator in 2.21 is replaced with a
classical field Ep (~r, t) = E˜p (t) e
ı~kpz. Assume that we are considering an infinitely narrow




a single frequency component. This is only approximate, however, in what follows we seek
to find the mean wavelengths, while the broadband spectral characteristics of the signal
and idler are suppressed, and thus any spread in the signal and idler wavelength due to
the pump is not accounted for in this analysis. Substituting the electric field operator
Ê
(−)
j (~r, t) = A× aˆ†je−ı(
~kjz−ωjt), j = s, i, (2.23)
which represents the creation of a photon in phase with the pump photon, into 2.21 we can
solve for the interaction by extending the time limit to ∞ and pulling the normalization




and the χ(2) term which, will be constant for a given wavelength, from
the integral. Integrating time leads to an expected constraint, the conservation of energy,
since this integral over the exponential function gives a delta function 2piδ (ωs + ωs − ωp),
from which follows the equation
ωp = ωs + ωi, (2.24)









−ı[(~ks+~ki−~kp)z]dV |ψo〉 = A′′Φ (∆kl) |Hs〉|Vi〉 (2.25)
where the signal and idler give rise to a horizontally (H) and vertically (V) polarized single
photon in the output mode of the crystal. A
′′
includes the slowly varying terms in 2.23 as
well as Ep and χ







which is maximal in the conservation of momentum
∆k = ~ks + ~ki − ~kp = 0. (2.27)
Equation 2.27 is known as the phase matching condition. In the limit of the crystal
length l → ∞ the bandwidth goes to zero, as the sinc function goes to a delta function.
This is of interest because a narrow bandwidth signal will allow stronger filtering, and
can be obtained with a longer crystal. As well, in the larger volume where the waves
interact the conversion rate will rise with a longer crystal. Thus it seems increasing the
crystal length will only improve things. In practice however, there is a limit to the length
of the crystal, since the pump and signal/idler waves will disperse differently due to the
material properties at their respective wavelengths. At some point, the waves will become
out of phase and there is no longer strong down-conversion. We see in the later section
on quasi-phase matching that engineering the crystal to be periodically poled allows the
crystal to be long while overcoming this effect, giving higher conversion and narrower
bandwidths. The quantum mechanics of nonlinear optical processes is discussed in detail
in the book by David Klyshko [38].
2.7.1 Non-Collinear Phase Matching in a BBO crystal
The source of entanglement for this experiment used a BBO down conversion crystal for
the generation of photon pairs, which are collected into single mode fibers.
The source used for the experiment is based on birefringence phase matching in a Beta
barium borate (BBO - β BaB2O4) crystal. This source has been well developed and it’s
parameters are reported on in the experimental section below. Physically, the generation
of Type II entanglement is the same as described for SPDC in equations 2.27, 2.24 and
2.21. The output photons are collected at the cross-over point of two phase matched rings
which are orthogonal in polarization. Thus, the source is termed to be in a non-collinear
arrangement because of the angular properties of the output signal and idler photons.
This source developed by Kwiat [40] can be referred to in our past paper [2].
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2.7.2 Quasi-phase Matching in a PPKTP Crystal
There are limitations in the number of correlated photon pairs created in the BBO source,
as well, a large spectral bandwidth for the daughter photons. These problems may be im-
proved upon using a quasi-phased matched down conversion source with PPTKP as the
conversion medium. The temperature tuning curves are calculated for this advanced pair
source to be used in a second generation experiment.
Quasi-phase matching is a technique to engineer the phase matching conditions for
nonlinear conversions that are not possible in a bulk crystal that relies on birefringence
for phase matching. It is done by inverting the ferroelectric poles of the crystal periodi-
cally, allowing the introduction of a flexible term, the poling period Λ, for selection of a
conversion mechanism. This allows many wavelengths to be generated by selecting the
proper poling period to maximize the effective nonlinearity for a given polarization and
direction of propagation in the crystal. In the following, a good reference which lists ma-
terial properties is the book by Dmitriev [41] which has a good introduction to nonlinear








Figure 2.5: The orientation of polarizations for the particular case of Type II collinear wave mixing,
for three waves; the pump, signal and idler, propagating in a nonlinear medium. Note, this case is used
for the tuning curves of Periodically Poled Potassium Titanyl Phosphate (PPKTP) difference frequency
generation.
The poling period is on the order m of the phase overlap between the pump and
daughter photons. This poling period allows for correction of the phase mismatch between
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Figure 2.6: Image of the PPKTP showing periodic poling regions. The scale marked is approximate
with lines ±1.
the signal or idler waves and the pump wave due to the various wavelengths traveling at
different speeds in the conversion medium. Periodic poling can be used to allow conversion
while extending the length of the crystal. Physically, only certain axes of the crystal may
be used for this method, because poling of the crystal favors some directions along the
crystal lattice. There are a number of methods to grow such a material, but succinctly,
the material is typically heated to a large temperature (> 800◦C) whereby a periodic
voltage is applied across the crystal using a small patterned electrode. The crystal is
then cooled to a temperature where the poling will become stable, and the electric field
is removed. Figure 2.6 is a photograph showing the poling periods of a PPKTP crystal
along the z axis.
A modified phase matching term from 2.27 includes the periodicity of the poling:
∆k = ~ks + ~ki − ~kp − 2pim
Λ
(2.28)
where m is the poling order.
Periodic Poling has been done usually in Lithium Tantalate (LT - LiTaO3), Lithium
Niobate (LN - LiNbO3), and Potassium Titanyl Phosphate (KTP - KTiOPO4) for useful
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generation of select frequencies. In particular, KTP is useful because of it’s strong χ(2)
interaction and ability to generate Type II conversion for photon pairs in the collinear
propagation direction which allows more signal to be collected. It is advantageously non-
hydrophilic, and only slightly biaxial4. This means the crystal properties in these two
axes will be roughly the same, namely we can use nx ≈ ny.
For signal generation near 800 nm in KTP, the poling period Λ = 10µm, as may be
calculated from equation 2.7.2 based on the material parameters for KTP. This crystal
can be obtained at lengths from 5 mm to 25 mm currently. The longer crystal length
makes the alignment harder but gives a narrower bandwidth, as can be determined from
the sinc term of equation 2.7. This is advantageous for filtering. As well, a longer crystal
means a larger signal rate since the volume of integration in equation 2.25 is larger. The
increase in signal rate will lead directly to an increase in the rate of key generation as the
QBER remains constant, assuming the quality of signal generated is constant with the
crystal length.
We aim to calculate the temperature dependence of the phase matching for tuning of
the wavelengths. The refractive index is sensitive to the temperature of the crystal, and so
the temperature should be held stable for generation of the polarization entangled pairs.
Additionally, degenerate frequency operation of the crystal is possible over a large spectral
range of output wavelengths by temperature tuning. An operating temperature may also
be chosen by a one to one correspondence with temperature to optimize signal wavelength,
in respect to atmospheric transmission, background reduction in a free space link and
detector sensitivity. To calculate the temperature tuning curves a number of factors must
be considered; thermal expansion, refractive index gradients due to temperature changes,
and the phase matching conditions. An experimental investigation [42] found the thermal
expansion of the material to depend on temperature as
l
′
(T ) /l (25◦C) = 1 + α
′
(T − 25◦C) + β ′ (T − 25◦C)2 , (2.29)
where α
′
= 6.7−6± 0.7 and β ′ = 11−9± 2 and l and l′ are crystal lengths at the reference
4The two optical axes are similar, so properties such as the refractive index or thermal expansion
along those two directions will be nearly equivalent, i.e. x ≈ y
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Contours Showing Characteristic Parabolic Behaviour of Temperature Tuning for













Figure 2.7: Absolute Phase Mismatching for Quasi-Phase Matched Type II Down Conversion in
PPKTP. Note the characteristic parabolic dependence on temperature in the contour plot (drawn on
lower plane).
temperature of 25◦C and the temperature T respectively. Geometric expansion of the
poling period will only effect the conversion wavelength by a factor of ∼= 10−1, as compared
to a change in phase-matching due to refractive index gradients with T but are included
for accuracy.
Now, substituting the expression for the wavenumber in a material
kj = 2pin (λj, T ) /λj
into the quasi-phase matching equation 2.7.2, including temperature dependence as the
variable T , we have
∆k =
2piny (λp, T )
λp
− 2piny (λs, T )
λs





which is plotted in absolute values in 2.7 based on values for the index which follow.
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Form A B C D crystal axis
one-pole 2.19229 0.83547 0.04970 0.01621 y
two-pole 2.12725 1.18431 5.14852×10−2 0.6603 z
Form E F - - crystal axis
two-pole 100.00507 9.68956×10−3 - - z
Table 2.1: Sellmeier equation coefficients for the one pole and two pole equations for the refractive
index of KTP.
The subscripts in ny,z account for the fact that the Type II process uses the pump in
the y axis of the crystal, while the signal and idler are converted via the y and z axes,
respectively. The pump wave, and daughter photons all travel in a collinear axis in this
phase matching arrangement.
Turning attention to solve 2.7.2, accurate equations for n (λ, T ) must be used and
the curves where ∆k = 0 are solved to find temperature tuning for constructive phase






is found to be accurate for the refractive index in the y axis [43], and a two pole Sellmeier





1− Eλ2 − Fλ
2 (2.32)
as is found to provide the best fits for the z axes [44] in the NIR and IR spectral regions.
The coefficients are listed in table 2.1.
Finally, temperature dependent dispersion5 which was experimentally investigated in
[42] is introduced. Similar equations are also studied in [45] but these coefficients are not
used. The refractive index follows a parabolic dependence with temperature
∆n (λ, T ) = n1 (λ) (T − 25◦C) + n2 (λ) (T − 25◦C)2 (2.33)
5Also called thermo-optic dispersion.
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Figure 2.8: Temperature tuning curves for the signal wave for three different pump wavelengths. A
small change in the wavelength of the laser diode leads to a large temperature shift required to select a







listed in table 2.2 for an expansion of third order. Taking the above factors into account,
it is possible to generate the temperature tuning curves for Type II down conversion in
the PPKTP crystal. The temperature and pump wavelength can be seen to have a strong
effect on the phase matched signal and idler wavelength as in figure 2.8, where a change
of ≈ 2 nm in pump wavelength requires a temperature change of ≈ 50◦C to maintain a
particular signal wavelength.
For a blue diode chosen at 407nm which was selected for a narrow band Littrow
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n1 (10
−6) n2 (10−8) n1 (10−6) n2 (10−8)
Axis z z y y
a0 9.9587 1.1882 6.2897 0.14445
a1 9.9228 10.459 6.3061 2.2244
a2 8.9603 9.8136 6.0629 3.5770
a3 4.1010 3.1481 2.6486 1.3470
Table 2.2: Temperature dependence fit coefficients for KTP used in equation 2.7.2.
stabilized pump LASER [47] we can see the signal and idler wavelength dependence with
temperature, as well as the frequency degenerate temperature in figure 2.9. The signal










→ λi = λsλp
λs − λp . (2.34)
This allows us to relate the signal and idler spectra together as a set to a given temperature
and pump wavelength directly from the crystal parameters.
The proposed source of entanglement using the PPKTP crystal requires a Sagnac loop
interferometer [48] where the pump illuminates the crystal through both directions of the
interferometer. This creates a spatial indistinguishability of the arrival of the signal and
idler on the out port of the interferometer due to symmetry of their generation, and a
entangled photon state in the polarization degree of freedom. The most recent version of
this source created visibilities better than 98% in a narrow bandwidth of roughly 1nm,
with 10 times more coincident counts than in our present system [49]. A longer distance
test, up to a few km’s, should be possible using the PPKTP source. It would be very
unlikely to acheive this distance using the BBO source due to the low pair generation
rate, and atmospheric losses.
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Signal and Idler Wave Temperature Tuning Curves for Phase Matched Cases














Figure 2.9: Temperature Tuning Curves for Type II (xy-y) Quasi-Phase Matching in a PPKTP Crystal.
The temperature required for degenerate down conversion is at the cross over of both wavelengths near
140◦C.
2.8 Atmosphere Absorption and Turbulence
Atmospheric losses must be considered for the free space channel. Here two main loss
effects due to fluctuations in the refractive index of the air channel are described.
Fortunately, air has negligible birefringence so the use of polarization coding for the
bits will mean there are negligible errors introduced in the bits through the atmospheric
channel6. The use of a free-space optical channel has other limitations rising from tur-
bulence in the air, which will effect the on the propagation of a the light beam. Signal
loss is imminent due to absorption and scattering just like in a fiber optic channel, while
6In the case of a fiber optical channel, time-bin encoding is more often chosen due to stress induced
instability of polarization in a typical silica fiber.
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Figure 2.9: Temperature Tuning Curves for Type II (xy-y) Quasi-Phase Matching in a PPKTP Crystal.
The temperature required for degenerate down conversion is at the cross over of both wavelengths near
140◦C.
2.8 Atmosphere Absorption and Turbulence
Atmospheric losses must be considered for the free space channel. Here two main loss
effects due to fluctuations in the refractive index of the air channel are described.
Fortunately, air has negligible birefringence so the use of polarization coding for the
bits will mean there are negligible errors introduced in the bits through the atmospheric
channel6. The use of a free-space optical channel has other limitations rising from tur-
bulence in the air, which will effect th o the propagation of a the ligh beam. Signal
loss is imminent due to absorption and scattering just like in a fiber optic channel, while
6In the case of a fiber optical channel, time-bin encoding is more often chosen due to stress induced
birefringence of polarization in a typical silica fiber.
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geometric coupling through the channel will fluctuate due to stochastic refractive index
changes. These later losses will limit coupling and may also require active stabilization
over a particular distance.
In air, fluctuations in the refractive index with temperature are on the order ∆n ≈ 10−6
for a change of 1◦C [54, 55] inside the free-space channel. Moreover, these fluctuations may
be on the scale of a few millimeters, to as much as a kilometer. The former fluctuations
would cause a distortion of the image pattern in a collimated beam of ≈10 cm diameter,
while fluctuations a few times the size of the beam will tend to steer the beam around
slightly. For free space QKD we are interested in maximizing tranmission across the
channel. Thus, some of the effects of a turbulent atmosphere, such as image quality, may
be ignored. Depending on the distance of the transmission, beam divergence, and the size




• pulse distortion or broadening;
• thermal blooming;
• scintillations.
Scintillations within the beam are not a concern since no image needs to be constructed
from the transmission, however, they will lead to fluctuations above and below the mean
intensity, or photon number in a random way. This is of concern when imaging celestial
objects for example, but will not cause ultimate losses over our distance. As well, pulse
distortion is negligible. Thermal blooming occurs with high energy beams, causing them
to self focus or causing nonlinear effects, and it can be ignored as we transmit a source of
single photons. Coherence loss is also negligible, leaving two main effects to be considered:
beam wandering, and beam spreading.
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2.8.1 Beam spreading and wandering
Two predominant effects of the turbulent atmosphere on transmission in a free space chan-
nel are described.











in meters, which is negligible over the distance of this experiment, since the initial beam
waist is 40 mm, the beam diameter changes less than one tenth a percent. Here L = 350 m,












which is the transverse coherence length, also know as Fried’s parameter or the diffraction
limited aperture of the atmosphere with units of length. This parameter depends strongly
on the atmospheric structure constant C2n which in most cases is numerically determined.
C2n depends on elevation, temperature, weather, wind speed and other factors which are
hard to determine, and ϕ is the declination angle with respect to the zenith direction.
The structure constant C2n is modeled in the Hufnagel-Valley 5/7 Model of Atmospheric
Turbulence [57], however, this model shows C2n at ground level spans a large range; with
C2n ≈ 10−3−10−7 over a few kilometers of elevation from ground level. Usually it is found
empirically, for which we have some observations only of the beam wander. Here, at 1 km
the beam wanders over an area with roughly twice it’s original diameter. At a constant
ground level, the C2n is pulled from the integral, which then evaluates to 3L/8. Assuming
that secϕ ≈ 1, we then have ρ0 ≈ 7.75× 10−9 (C2nL)−3/5 m.















where ρ2d is already shown to be negligible. Again we have to deal with the unknown
parameter ρ0 for diffraction of the atmosphere. An empirical expression for the beam
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diameter D was obtained by Buck [59]
D = αLβ (2.38)
with the dimensionless parameters α = 4.5×10−6 and β = 1.2. This shows the turbulence
model to overestimate the spreading with distance. In any case, in respect to a distance
of 350m the atmospheric spreading evaluates to a small number. Given observations of
the beam over distances in earlier experiments [2] it is clear that within the diffraction
limit of the beam, spreading is not much of a concern. Note, the dependence of beam
spreading with distance goes like L11/3 owing to completely atmospheric turbulence, and
is inversely proportional to the beam diameter sent. Thus, a larger beam diameter can be
chosen for longer distances, however, the limit to the diameter will depend on the amount
of background light input into the receiver during day.
A value of ρ0 may be calculated from beam wandering observations. Beam wandering











The Fried parameter is estimated to be ρ0 = {1.45× 10−8, 3.65× 10−6} m by taking a
range of values for C2n from the Hufnagel-Valley 5/7 Model of Atmospheric Turbulence






{1.6× 105, 0.16} m2. The later is of the order of the square beam diameter. Owing to
the observations an estimated turbulence loss over 1 km is 50%, and in our short test
range of 350 m losses of roughly 15−25% by simply comparing average areas of the beam
observed over a period of time, assuming there are no fluctuation in the stability of the





which represents the dB loss based on
a geometric overlap between the receiver aperture and the final beam diameter, we can
estimate the parameter ρ0 = 5.8145 × 10−5m from the beam wander observed. Due to
the large range of values prevalent from the model it may be most instructive to make
measurements on site, and fit them to the expected exponential laws described. It would





Previous reports of the hardware and software used in this experiment are in [55, 56].
The Quantum Key Distribution system is as well reported on from previous experiments
[2, 27, 57] and otherwise any modifications are stated herein.
3.1 Set-up
Here we describe the experimental setup, including hardware, alignment procedures, et
cetera.
Optical Channel: The optical channel is aligned roughly E16◦S, (16◦ South of East)
along the horizon with the receiver pointing toward the morning sun as in figure 3.5. The
minimal incident angle of the sun and the line of sight was thus about 16◦ which allows the
experiment to be tested near the channel orientation where maximal coupling of daylight
into the channel is expected. An ad hoc channel should not be limited to be perpendicular
to the sun’s projected daytime trajectory, so this case should be tested.
Detector units: Actively quenched avalanche photo diode (APD) detectors may be
subject to irreversible destruction when exposed to an excessive amount of light; such
a situation may occur if there is excessive scattering in the optical communication link.
These detectors are attractive for their fast recovery times, however for a the daylight
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Figure 3.1: The free space optical channel spans a turbulent atmosphere of 350 m across the NUS
campus. The receiver takes cover beneath the sports pavilion, while the sending telescopes are positioned
behind the windows of the building. Negligible birefringence is introduced in air.
version of the experiment destruction of the device is a problem. For passively quenched
APD’s this is not a problem, since the electrical power deposited into the device can be
limited to a safe operation regime at all times. We use passively quenched APD’s for this
experiment. The passively quenched APD’s are configured in Geiger mode by setting an
extra 15 V above the breakdown point while monitoring the device on an oscilloscope.
This allows increased sensitivity so that a single photon may be detected, and such a
device is commonly referred to as a single photon APD (SPAPD). Dark counts of each
SPAPD are then compared to verify that the four SPAPD’s all have an equal quantum
efficiency. The detection unit is outlined in figure 2.2.
TCP/IP Channel: A classical channel using wire mesh antenna and a wireless
modem using a TCP/IP link is setup. For this small distance the quality is very good,
and is only limited by the bandwidth of the wireless channel which is 1 MB/second.
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The link was tested up to 20 km and still shows good signal quality. Each antenna is
mechanically stabilized and directed to optimize the signal. 250 mW of power are applied
for the wireless link. This was used for public communications. All the software for the
key generation was programmed by Christian Kurtsiefer and has been provided as
open source1.
Photon Pair Source: The polarization-entangled photon pairs are prepared from
a source based on type-II parametric down conversion (PDC) in a non-collinear config-
uration similar to [40]. It is pumped with a CW free-running diode laser with power of
30mW and a center wavelength of 407 nm, producing pairs at a degenerate wavelength
around 814 nm in single mode fibers. When directly connected to single photon detectors,
we typically observe single rate per arm of 78 kcps and 71 kcps, with a coincidence rate
of 12 kcps. The visibility as in equation 2.10 of polarization correlations in the HV and
±45◦ basis are 97.5± 0.5% and 92.1± 0.8%, respectively. While these sources have been
substantially surpassed in quality and brightness [47, 48], this particular device is both
simple and robust. The next generation PPKTP source discussed above will allow further
distances and higher count rates in future experiments.
Telescopes: As endpoints in our transmission channel, we use a pair of custom tele-
scopes to transmit one member of the entangled photon pair across a distance of 350m.
The relative orientation of both telescopes is adjusted using manual tip/tilt stages with an
angular resolution of ≈ 10µrad, mounted on tripods intended for mobile satellite links.
The telescopes are not actively stabilized, but this could be added for spanning larger
distances, or to compensate for thermal drifts in the mounting stages. The sending tele-
scope consists of fiber port, a small achromat with f = 100 mm to reduce the effective
numerical-aperture of the single mode fiber, and a main achromat with f = 310 mm and
75 mm diameter, transforming the optical mode of the fiber to a collimated Gaussian
beam with a waist parameter of 20 mm. Nominally this results in a Rayleigh length
2zr = piω
2
o/λ of 1.6 km at our operation wavelength of λ ≈810 nm, well above our target
distance over NUS campus pictured in figure 3.1.
1All the code is available under http://code.google.com/p/qcrypto
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Figure 3.2: Schematic diagram of the QKD setup. Components are a sending telescope (ST) located
at Alice (A), receiving telescope (RT) located at Bob (B), single mode fibers (SMF), a wave plate (WP),
compensating crystals (CC) to address birefringent walk-off; polarization analyzer units (PA) comprising
a 50:50 Beam splitter (BS), polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and a half wave plate (HW); a time stamp
unit (TU) referenced to a Rb oscillator (Rb), a receiving telescope (RT) with a pinhole (PH) for spatial
filtering and an interference filter (IF) for spectral filtering. A wireless link (WL) is used for classical
communication.
3.2 Filtering Techniques
Spectral, spatial and temporal filtering methods are used to reduce the background rate at
the receiver telescope to bring accidental coincidence rates low enough for secure QKD.
The filters used to remove background light to acceptable levels include the spatial
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filters, mounted internally and externally to the sending and receiving telescopes, a tem-
poral filter applied in the software, and spectral filtering aligned in the lab and internal
to the receiving telescope at Bob. Here we discuss their figures of merit, and describe the
design and alignment procedures for each.
3.2.1 Temporal Filter
Due to the tight time correlation of the down-converted photons, it is expected that
paired events on either side of the transmission will occur within a small time window.
Public discussion of events at the onset of the data acquisition using a correlation method
searches for the highest overlap to correctly match the pairs. The temporal filter acts to
simply ignore any coincident events outside of a particular time delay, by choosing events
in a smaller time window. This acts to remove unwanted detection of background in the
optical channel along with a real event at the source side of the channel from the key. We
limit our time window to roughly 2 ns, which is close to the minimum time acceptable
owing to detector jitter.
Referring to figure 3.3, the overlap between detector pairs operating in the same basis is
excellent, but there is approximately 0.5 ns difference between the two detector groupings.
These groupings are just the two measurement bases, and are publicly announced during
the sifting of the raw key, so will not compromise the security of key generation. The
coincidence window of 2 ns is indicated in the graph, showing that that there are some
key generating counts being lost outside of the time window. Unfortunately the delays
for all of the detectors were not equalized during alignment, though not interfering with
the success of the experiment, some coincidence counts are lost due to this error. If the
detector groups were mutually compensated, the coincidence window could have been
tightened with no loss of signal, but reducing the background proportionally. On the
order of 10% more key may be generated correcting for this overlap, as estimated by
inspection of figure 3.3.
It should be noted at Bob’s side of the channel, i.e. the one exposed to a lot of
background light, obtains more photon counts than the detection module which is coupled
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Figure 3.3: Histograms of time delays between the four main coincidence combinations contributing to
the raw key. We can see that the two bases are overlapping very well, however, some signal loss occurs
outside of this time window. By adjusting the two publicly announced bases to overlap in time some
more correlation counts would be generated.
directly to the entanglement source. Each of these events corresponds to a time tag along
with the result for the basis and the polarization. We found at first that sending Bob’s
counts over the classical channel quickly saturated the channel bandwidth of the TCP/IP
communication link. Thus, it was most efficient to send information from Alice’s side of
the channel Bob’s side of the channel (to the remote side) for the processing stages of the
key generation protocol.
3.2.2 Spectral Filter
The source of entanglement was thermally stabilized in a lab using long single mode fibers
to connect to our sending telescope. It was aligned through the particular interference
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filter we used by observing maximal correlation counts, and minimal correlation counts
in the lower ±45◦ basis fringes as in section 2.4, which serves to maximize the visibility as
long as the coincidence counts are maintained. The output was coupled into a spectrom-
eter and a signal is measured both with and without the filter present and is illustrated
in figure 3.4. A broadband scan is performed over the spectrum corresponding to the
SPAPD’s sensitive regime, and is averaged to estimate the blockage of ambient light.
We find that the interference filter (IF) performs on average across the whole spectrum
with and Optical Density (OD) of 2. Under the limiting assumption that the detector
sensitivity and spectrum of the background are flat, this figure will underestimate the
effectiveness of the spectral filter.
Figure 3.4: Spectral distribution of photons from the SPDC source, and transmission profile of
the interference filter used to suppress background light outside that range. With this filter/source
combination, a signal loss of 57% is introduced. In comparison, the PPKTP photon pair source has a
bandwidth of ≈1 nm, which will couple with much higher transmission through the interference filter.
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3.2.3 Spatial Filter
Spatial filters made a significant reduction of the background light. The spatial filters are
described here and the spatial coupling of background light is discussed.
A significant reduction of background events was achieved by reducing the acceptance
angle of the detector, reducing the light scattered from elements of the optical ports
close to the optical channel and reducing the amount of noise coupled from outside of
the acceptance angle. The main portion of daylight noise coming from the direct line of
sight of the receiver is contributed by scattering in its field-of-view (FOV) as shown in
the measurements of figure 3.6. This area can be reduced by choosing a smaller pinhole
aperture as a spatial filter. We found a 30µm pinhole to be the optimal choice when
accounting for pointing accuracy and maintaining signal transmission for this distance, as
in table 3.1. This gives a calculated FOV of 73 mm diameter which will strongly contribute
to daylight noise counts.
Pinhole (µm) Transmission FOV ( m2) SNR factor
20 32% 0.0076 42.1
30 72% 0.0095 75.78
50 82% 0.014 58.57
100 83% 0.0288 28.47
no pinhole 83% ≈ 4 ≈ 0.2
Table 3.1: Transmission for various pinholes measured through both sending and receiving optics in
the laboratory, and their relative merit considering signal transmission and background coupling in the
FOV. Interference filter losses are not included in this measurement. A pinhole of 30µm is the optimal
choice for the experiment.
Using black-out material, a dark area is constructed to extend over the FOV on the
sending side, see figure 3.5. The internal parts of the sending telescope including the silver
fiber couplers are also coated in black out material to reduce reflections anywhere inside
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Figure 3.5: Schematic of telescope orientation with respect to the sun showing positioning of spatial
baﬄes. γ reaches a minimum angle of 16◦ near dawn.
the channel. Shielding against direct sunlight on this area reduces the noise scattered
from the lens of the sending telescope into the receiver telescope. Together these steps
reduce the background counts by 12 dB.
A set of apertures placed periodically along the receiver telescope as light baﬄes
removes scattered light coupled to the detector through the pinhole outside of the line-of-
sight of the telescope. These angular spatial modes come from multiple reflections inside
the receiver assembly. Seven concentric apertures internal to the receiver telescope, as
well as five apertures extending 30 cm externally to the receiver telescope constructed to
match the collimated beam, removed another 3− 4 dB of background light.
The FOV can be estimated using a ray tracing calculation. Assuming the outer perime-
ter of the FOV corresponds to a marginal ray tracing through the aperture of the lens
and the pinhole, we perform analytical calculation of the diameter and area. Realistically,
this area will estimate the maximal coupling as seen in the measurements presented in
figure 3.6, while coupling will fall off exponentially outside of the area due to the wave
nature of light, and atmospheric beam spreading.
Let Dl be the whole lens aperture, L be the distance of the optical channel, f the focal
distance of the lens, Dp the diameter of the pinhole, and ξ the angular power of the lens
as in figure 3.7. Then defining new terms a = Dl
2
2







+ f 2 where
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Reduction of Background as Percent of Unfiltered Configuration using Spatial Baffles
20 um pinhole, sunny conditions
 
 
Figure 3.6: Relative reduction of background events using three different baﬄe configurations: 1 - no
baﬄe, 2 - internal baﬄes, 3 - both internal and external baﬄes, and 4 - the largest reduction when light
is absorbed directly in the FOV of the optical channel while both baﬄes are in place.
the lens diameter and focal length are fixed for our receiving telescope we have












from which we obtain the equation for the FOV by solving for ξ as
Dfov (L,Dp) = Dl + 2L tan (ξ (Dp)) . (3.2)
Overestimating the distance as 1200 m to construct a sending telescope which may be
used for the longer distance tests, we find values for area and diameter (see figure 3.8)
for a selection of standard pinholes sizes. These estimates were verified to be good in our




Pinhole Aperture Lens Aperture Nominal FOV
Figure 3.7: Geometry of ray tracing analysis for estimation of the field of views diameter Dfov. A
marginal ray runs parallel to the optical axis originating at the center of the pinhole. The marginal ray
from the edge of the pinhole is projected over the target distance L. f is the focal length of the lens,
while Dp and Dl are diameters of the pinhole and the lens respectively.
observed by using a white sheet to introduce photon counts, fitting well to the calculated
value of 7.37 cm. While the receiver telescope is coupled on center to the sending telescope,
the distance from the center of the channel to the sharp edge of the sheet is recorded while
a spike in singles counts is monitored remotely. This is only a rough estimate and includes
errors associated with mechanical stability.
The pinhole transmission for various sizes was investigated and is listed in table 3.1.
This is measured by simply comparing optical powers from a collimated beam coupled
through the receiving telescope with no pinhole, to the optical power measured with a
pinhole aligned at the focus, to estimate the signal coupling parameter. The amount
of background coupling for a particular pinhole is estimated by using the diameter of
the FOV from equation 3.2.3. This is justified because the FOV is where 90% of the
daylight background originates, as observed in figure 3.6. From these parameters, a figure
of merit to estimate a Signal to Noise Ratio for a particular pinhole diameter is calculated
and presented in table 3.1. We can see a 30µm pinhole is the best choice under these
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Figure 3.8: The area and diameter plotted for various pinhole sizes, based on a distance of 1.2 km.
A 30µm pinhole was chosen for our experiment having a distance of 350 m, as the optimal decrease in
background counts, while maintaining the robustness of the alignment.
considerations2.
3.3 Alignment Procedure
The alignment procedure used to prepare the source of polarization entangled photon pairs,
and achieve maximal transmission through the free space channel is described herein.
2We did test the 20µm pinhole in the field but found alignment accuracy poor, and signal loss too
large, for stable key generation.
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3.3.1 Source
The source of entangled photon pairs was initially exposed to outdoor environmental con-
ditions through an open office window at the sending side. Large fluctuations in the total
coincidences over periods of a few hours were observed. To compensate for the degrada-
tion of the source parameters, a long single mode fiber optic cable was run to the sending
telescope from the photon pair source in a laboratory with a stable temperature. We then
found upon the initial source alignment that parameters did not degrade throughout the
experiment.
The pump is focused down in the crystal, and by back propagating signals, the fiber
coupler aperture is matched to the size of the pump [63]. Single count rates are maximized
in the operating bandwidth using the interference filter from our receiving telescope,
until correlation counts are observed. These correlation counts are maximized toward an
expected ratio of ≈1:5-6 to single counts, representing the source efficiency parameter.
The visibility in the ±45◦ basis, where V±45◦ = (Rmax +Rmin) / (Rmax −Rmin) as
described in equation 2.10 for average minimum and maximum rates observed is then
measured and optimized by rotating two polarizers in the signal and idler path. The down
conversion crystal is tilted to minimize those counts further, effectively maximizing the
fringe size, or maximizing the collection of a singlet bell pair. It was observed previously
that tilting the conversion crystal within the range of the fringe minimum has little effect
on the total number of coincidence counts, thus using the crystal tilt in this way does
not lead to other misalignments. Then, using a compensation crystal in both beam
paths we finally minimize coincidence counts further in the ±45◦ and achieve visibilities
of V±45◦ ≈ 92 − 93% which are observed over a series of alignment stages during the
experiment. Thus, these parameters for the quality of entanglement are assumed to be
indicative of the source throughout the entire experiment.
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Figure 3.9: Polarization Entanglement Source based on a BBO crystal. Non-collinear
signal and idler beams are collected into single mode fibers. Compensation crystals are
used to remove timing distinguishability of the photon pairs.
3.3.2 Free Space Coupling
Alignment of the two telescopes in the optical link requires a few stages before the source
signal is coupled. The key is that the small pinhole on the order of ten µm’s which is
required for removing quite a lot of background must be coupled across the channel. Al-
though in some experiments performed at night a pinhole is not used for ease of alignment
[29], a pinhole is required to act as a spatial filter of daylight background.
Two bright laser diodes, one at 650 nm, and one at 810 nm, spectrally near the photon
pair source wavelength, are used for coarse and fine alignment. They are coupled to
the sending telescope for alignment using an aspherical lens focused into a single mode
fiber and plugged into the telescope. The diodes are used to observe the collimated
beam size, the location of the focal point in the receiving telescope, and coupling rates
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on the receiving telescope detector unit while adjustments are made. Collimation must
be maintained such that the beam is not clipped at the receiver. In fact, the initial
alignment had roughly 50% unexpected losses from a misalignment of the collimator.
Using a raytrace, the position of the two collimator lenses was corrected by projecting a
set of marginal rays to distances of 500 m and 1500 m. The beam waist was optimized by
forcing the equality of the beam diameter in a merit function to find the best positioning
of the lenses of the sending telescope (ST) as in figure 3.2. The final collimated beam can
be finely adjusted by translating the single mode fiber tip along the optical axis at the
input of the collimator.
For rough alignment of the telescopes the red diode is used. The beam is guided to
the receiving lens and the focal point of the red light may be observed by eye by looking
into the receiving telescope unit through the 3 inch lens. Both sending and receiving units
axes are set parallel to the axis of the free space channel3. In most cases some light is
seen coupled through the pinhole after this procedure is complete, and the tilt and pan
of each telescope unit is adjusted to maximize photo-counts. If no counts were observed,
the position of the pinhole with respect to the lens was realigned. The collimation of the
beam is adjusted roughly over the channel since it was only aligned over a short distance
in the laboratory.
The 810 nm laser diode is then switched into the sending telescope port, and observed
across the channel on a ruled sheet using an infrared viewer. It is set to the appropriate
beam width. With the 810 nm diode now coupled, photo-counts are re-optimized to
correct any misalignment from the re-collimation or chromatic effect of the lens. A series
of adjustments of the pinhole position and the tip tilt stages is then performed to maximize
photo-count rates. This is performed while periodically unplugging alignment diodes and
plugging in the photon pair source. If the source is found with a sufficient count rate, it is
used for fine alignment of the pinhole. It was found that during the day, should the link
become decoupled, it is possible to turn up the power on the (preferably IR) laser diodes
used for alignment and observe their photo detection above the background rate through
3This process could be automated with a compass, a small CCD array and a control system
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the channel. In this condition it is found that the telescopes could be aligned through the
free space channel in daylight conditions by maximizing the diode coupled photo-counts
as far as possible using the micrometer pins of the telescopes. By iterating this procedure
while lowering the intensity of the diode, optimal coupling was established during day
and the source could be plugged back into the channel to resume key generation.
For this test, the long duration of the experiment requires that the system is peri-
odically maintained, as we observed a gradual reduction of signal coupling through the
channel over periods of a few hours and at particular points of the day. Should the signal
for key generation be lost for a long period, the system must be halted and resynchronized,
which is possible only up to a limiting ratio of coincidence counts to background counts4.
This procedure is explained in more detail in the paper by Caleb Ho of reference [64].
It was observed that the signal rate dropped most often during sunrise or during periods
of temperature change during sunset, and in rainy conditions. Thermal expansion was
the likely cause of this observation, as the absorption of heat by the telescope mechanics
while the sun was striking it would induce some expansion. Luckily this expansion was
small enough to keep the pinhole and lens at the proper distance from each other and the
sending telescope was not affected as it was protected from strong sunlight. By adjusting
the tilt it was possible to compensate slowly for this drift and maintain coincidences at
the expected rates5.
4See synchronization in the results section below.
5Horizontal adjustment was not often required, maybe because less effect due to symmetric forces in
this dimension weakened the effect of decoupling with thermal expansion. The vertical tilt of the sending




We present the final data of the QKD experiment which ran during both night and day,
and compare the data to the expected outcomes as estimated from the theory section above.
A cryptographic key generation protocol based on BBM92 is demonstrated using en-
tangled photon pairs in a free-space channel during daylight hours. The first test similar
in motivation is by Seward [60] where no key was generated. Preliminary results of this
test were presented in the conference proceedings for CLEO [57]. This is the first report of
a daylight operating QKD system using entangled photons over a continual cycle period
of 24 hours, in both day and night conditions. We generated key over four days at both
day and night, creating roughly 3.75 MB of key per day, or roughly 350 (bits/s), over a
distance of 350 m. During this three day period, very sunny conditions and a few serious
rain storms were endured. We found reduction of transmission in the channel during rain
and higher error rates during sun. But throughout this period we maintain an error rate
allowing us to create secure key, as the system recovered during any events where source
was completely attenuated [3].
The first tests of the filtered count rates in the receiver during day showed that the
daylight photon counts did not saturate the detectors. See figure 4.1. This showed the
daylight operation was in principle possible and that background rates rbg did not saturate
the detectors. QKD test runs during the morning began to be successful once the correct
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Figure 4.1: Preliminary tests during daylight hours from 7am to 3pm 15/5/2008. The photo-count
rate is sampled every two seconds. Fluctuations in the count rates mid-day arise from intermittent
cloud cover. We find there is no saturation of the photo detector units and rates between 20 000 and
100 000 counts/sec. Background counts from the experiment are larger because this test result was over
a different channel orientation and a shorter distance. Note, the bright alignment diode was switched off
before sunrise as seen on the left of the graph.
symmetry of the classical communication was used. The high bandwidth of information
at the detector receiving large background rates initially saturated the classical channel.
Thus, data was send from the side of the channel connected to the detectors in the
laboratory, not exposed to high background counts.
Baﬄes external to the receiving telescope were re-constructed after the initial QKD
test runs for a reduced aperture size which was 40 mm in diameter instead of 80 mm in
diameter to exactly match the diameter of the collimated beam from the sending telescope.
At this point, data was generated and monitored remotely for the entire test period.
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Figure 4.2: Experimental results for 10th and 11th November, 2008. All experimental points are
sampled down, and the solid lines represent a moving average as a guide to the eye. Top panel: (a) in
red, photon detection events on Alice’s detector; (b) in blue, photon detection events on Bob’s detector.
Middle panel: (c) in red, the rate of raw key events; (d) in green, the sifted key; (e) in blue, the final key
rate after privacy amplification and error correction stages. Bottom panel: (f) in red, the QBER as a
percentage; (g) in green, the estimated rate of accidental counts.
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4.1 48 Hours of Key Exchange
Referring to figure 4.2, the top panel records the firing rate of the single photon detectors
at Alice and at Bob. The stable trace labeled (a) in red corresponds to Alice’s detector
connected directly to one arm of the entanglement source, which is isolated from changes
in ambient light. The other trace (b) in blue on the remote side, or Bob’s side, is the
detector coupled to the entanglement source arm through the free space channel. We
can see the background rate as single photon counts in Bob’s detector rise during day
above 150 kcps and fall to less than 10 kcps at night. The middle panel traces show (c)
the number of raw pair events collected in red, (d) the sifted events in green whereupon
roughly half the raw key is removed as the measurement bases did not coincide, and (e)
in blue, which are the final key bits after error correction and privacy amplification, to be
used for the creation of the cipher. The lower panel shows the number of accidental pair
events detected (g) in green, which is estimated by using correlated detection events that
fall outside of the timing window. The QBER level as a percentage (f) in the red trace of
the bottom pane is shown, and can be seen to rise with accidental rates, but never crosses
the secure threshold at QBER ≈ 11%.
The experiment was run continuously over a period from 9.11.2008, 18:00 SGT to
14.11.2008, 2:00 SGT over four consecutive days. In this period we saw extremely bright
sunlight, tropical thunderstorms and partly cloudy weather; over the whole period the
Events H +45◦ V −45◦
H 599 22 791 34 032 18 409
+45◦ 18 647 2 894 17 512 44 841
V 29 062 16 422 2 125 25 246
−45◦ 14 635 40 558 22 280 1 498
Table 4.1: Correlation events between each of the four detectors on both sides. Though anti-correlation
is clear, there is some higher than expected correlations due to contributions from sunlight.
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figure 4.2 we show the results collected over two consecutive days. On the second day
we identified 14.72 · 107 raw coincidences. After sifting, this resulted in 7.18 · 107 of raw
uncorrected bits, with a total of 3.5 · 106 errors corrected using a modified CASCADE
protocol [61], which was carried out over blocks of at least 5 000 bits to a target bit error
ratio of 10−9.
We do observe that during severe rainstorms which brought ηt ≈ 1 − 2% the QBER
began to rise approching ≈ 9 − 10%. Luckily, during these storms the background was
also lower than during intense sunlight, due to the overhead cloud coverage. Yet, these
weather conditions are not necessarily the norm and it must be considered that some
periods of key generation will be insecure.
For the privacy amplification step, we arrive at a knowledge of an eavesdropper on the
error-corrected raw key determined by (a) the actual information revealed in the error
correction process, and (b) the asymptotic (i.e. assuming infinite key length) expression
for the eavesdropping knowledge inferred from the actually observed QBER qT , IE =
−qt log2 qt − (1− qt) log2(1− qt) of an equivalent true single photon BB84 protocol as in
equation 2.9. Privacy amplification itself is carried out by binary multiplication/addition
of blocks of raw key vectors with a length of at least 5 000 bits with a rectangular matrix
filled with a pseudo random balanced bit stream from a 32 bit linear-feedback shift register,
seeded with a number from a high-entropy source for each block. We are left with 3.33·107
of secure bits for this 24 hour period, corresponding to an average key generation rate of
385 bits per second (bps). In these conditions, the raw key generation rates are far from
uniform during the acquisition period; we see a maximum secure key generation rate of
533 bps in darkness and a minimum of 29 bps around noon in rainy conditions. A few
blocks of the final key over the entire two day test period contain no secure bits, but this
is very rare.
Referring to equation 4.4, the detected background rate r′bg shows saturation, due
to the intrinsic dead time of the four detectors. Less coincidence counts are detected for
higher background count rates. The observed background rate increases up to ≈ 450 kcps,
which leads also to a reduction of the sifted key rate, rsig, by 20% and an increase of the
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Figure 4.3: Correlation events between each of the four detectors as in table 4.1 for visual reference.
resulting QBER qt up to 6.5%. The efficient filtering of the ambient light prevents a
higher background, which would lead to an increase of the QBER above the threshold of
11% where no private key can be established between the two parties. This threshold is
not reached during the whole experiment, thus continuous operation is possible when the
transmission of photon pairs between the parties is maintained.
The raw key compression ratio in the privacy amplification step should actually also
take care of a limited entropy in the raw key due to part-to-part variation in detector
efficiencies. This information was obtained before the main key generation process by
establishing the complete correlation matrix (see table 4.1) out of an ensemble of 148 493
coincidence events with matching bases.
The asymmetry between 0 and 1 results in the HV basis is 53.9 : 46.1± 0.2%, and in
the ±45◦ basis 52.5 : 47.5±0.2%. Using again entropy as a simple measure of information
leakage, this detector asymmetry would allow an eavesdropper to obtain 0.45% of the raw
key for events in the HV basis, and 0.18% in the ±45◦ basis. At the moment, however,
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it is not obvious that a simple reduction of the final key size in the privacy amplification
step due to various information leakage channels would be sufficient to ensure that the
eavesdropper has no access to any elements of the final key. We also note that the choice
between the two measurement bases is not completely balanced; the ratio of HV vs. ±45◦
coincidences is 42.5 : 57.5± 0.1%. Furthermore, this asymmetry varies over time. For the
combined asymmetry between logical 0 and 1 bits in the raw key we find around 51.5%
during night time, and 54.0% during daytime. A system which captures this variability in
detection efficiencies (and also would allow to discover selective detector blinding attacks)
would have to monitor this asymmetry continuously.
We can estimate how well the experiment performs for a given number of background
events. Figure 4.4 shows theoretical values for background and signal rates according to
equations 2.15 and 2.18, and experimental data for the coincident detection events and
error ratios output from the error correction module during all two days of the experiment.
The dead-time affected detector response is also shown assuming τd = 1µs in equation
2.16 to visualize the saturation effect of the background light on the detector. This effect
contributes to the reduction of coincidence counts and key generation rates with higher
background levels.
The night time periods with rsig ≈ 12 kcps and a total dark count rate of 7 kcps
contribute to events on the low background regime of the experiment forming a vertical
line to the left of figure 4.4. We cannot differentiate between fluctuations due to changes in
the source and those in the transmission channel, but since the source itself was protected
against thermal fluctuations, we attribute them to variations in transmission ηt due to
changes in the coupling of the telescopes.
The strongly fluctuating background during daytime contributes to the broadly scat-
tered data between rbg = 20 and 500 kcps. If the source properties and channel coupling
were constant, the deviation of qt and rsig from the theoretical value would be both ran-
domly distributed. Figure 4.4, however, shows more structure in rsig than in qt which we
attribute to changes in the coupling between the telescopes due to thermal expansion.
Nevertheless, the experimental values fit the theoretical prediction well. We note that
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Figure 4.4: Detection behavior due to an external background rate rbg for parameters representative
for our experiment. The dense points at the left of the plot correspond to events obtained at
night, whereas daylight events are spread out to the right, showing key generation rates and the
QBER with respect to the background level. We can see that the drift of the coupling through the
channel during the 48 hours of key exchange causes a large spread of key rates and QBER values. For
reference, the scaling function for the detectors as in equation 2.6 is plotted to show the effect of dead time.
saturation of the detectors is never a problem.
There are two contributors to the variability in key generation rate: First, atmo-
spheric conditions such as rainfall reduce the transmission and thus the number of raw
key events before the error correction and privacy amplification steps, but the QBER
remains unchanged. On the other hand we have extremely bright conditions where ac-
cidental coincidences increase significantly. In this regime, as the background rises, the
signal rate is reduced due to the dead time of the detectors. Furthermore, the QBER
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increases according to equation (2.15), occasionally preventing the generation of a secure
key. But even under bright conditions, the system still keeps track of the time drift
between the two reference clocks with the time-correlated coincidences from the source
without a need for re-synchronization.
4.2 Synchronization
This describes the test used to estimate the level of background light that a synchroniza-
tion algorithm can operate in. The ratio of total photo-detection counts to the number
of coincident counts when no background light is coupled is found to be 250 ± 10 beyond
which the synchronization algorithm will not work.
The first few seconds of key generation requires that the detection events of each
photon pair are matched in time. This is performed in a synchronization stage at the
beginning of each test run, where we compare 10 s of data from both sides, long enough
to cope with added background counts. A correlation algorithm looks for the maximum
overlap of the timing of events to record the offset between photons at the local side, to
those traveling through the channel to the remote side. In fact, the algorithm alone is
active research in clock synchronization [59]. This makes sure that the correct pairs are
matched up in the key at both sides. The software continuously checks the overlap in
case of any drift.
It is instructive to test a threshold where it will be successful in the presence of
background counts. It was required during the real data acquisition that we restart the
program during day, and synchronization was successful. However, we seek a more con-
trolled method to explore the upper level for the algorithm to be robust against added
background counts in the correlation algorithm. Laboratory tests are done using a simu-
lated background by coupling a broadband flash lamp into the receiver to set background
rates by geometric coupling, and tested at a level where synchronization is possible. The
background is then raised for each successive test, until synchronization is unsuccessful.
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Each time the background light level is set, the algorithm is run and the success of the
synchronization is recorded as true of false. Three tests are performed, where the source
is initially coupled while rbg = 0 to coincidence rates of 3400 /s, 2100 /s, and 1000 /s. For
each of these coincidence count levels, five tests are averaged for an estimate of the ratio
of coincidences to background levels where synchronization becomes unsuccessful. The
values for three selected tests are presented in tables 4.2.
We report in table 4.2 on the ratio of the total singles counts to coincidence counts
which are reduced as the total level rises as in equation 2.16 and the ratio of total singles
counts to the initial coincident count rate. The total singles S follows from the previously
introduced terms, S = rbg + r1 + rdc1 where r1 is the singles photo-detection rate from
the source, including coincidence events. The ratio of total singles to initial count near
the failure is averaged over 15 sets of tests to be roughly 250± 10.
Notice, this value is for the case of an embedded detector at the local side, but in the
case of two free space optical links [29] with background levels as in figure 2.4) the syn-
chronization algorithm would need to cope with large coincidence rates due to background
light. Failure would be at a much lower ratio.
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2600 500000 T 192 147
2200 780000 T 355 229
2200 820000 T 373 241
2000 900000 T 450 265
- 920000 F - -
- 1120000 F - -
(2100) 24000 T
1400 500000 T 357 238
- 540000 F - -
1400 540000 T 386 257
- 600000 F - -
(1000) 16000 T
900 180000 T 200 180
900 200000 T 222 200
800 220000 T 275 220
- 250000 F - -
Table 4.2: Synchronization tests recorded near the point where synchronization failure occurs.
Singles are the total counts on the detector including both background and signal counts. Here
initially 3400 /s (top table), 2100 /s (middle table), and 1000 /s (bottom table) coincidences are
coupled while rbg = 0, and the computed ratio is referred to above as ’ SinglesInitialCoincidences ’. Once
the background light is turned on coincidence counts are measured again and the computed ratio
is referred to as ’ SinglesCoincidences ’. The coincidences are reduced when background levels rise by the
saturation of the detector, as described in equation 2.6. Averages of these tests are taken to find
the ratio of ≈ 250±10 single counts to coincident counts as a maximal level for successful synchronization.
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4.3 Applying Random Number Tests to the Key
Here we present data obtained from the random number tests performed on the raw data
of the key. Each algorithm is given some discussion and a conclusion is outlined at the
end. Some of the tests discussed in this section are plotted and included in the appendix.
In the ideal case, the cryptographic device will output an identical key to both parties
which is a statistically independent and unbiased binary digit. As discussed previously,
the beauty of QKD is that quantum correlations act to distribute the random key symmet-
rically, distributing a resource for a one-time-pad, while errors in the correlation denote
the presence of an eavesdropper. But, regardless of the QBER measured, if the key gen-
eration is biased due to the physical device for example, an eavesdropper can induce no
errors in the correlation but by knowledge of a systematic bias, obtain some knowledge
of the key with a high probability. Therefore, security relies on the ability to generate
unpredictable, or random, keys. Randomness tests must be used to ensure the proper
function of the cryptographic system, including hardware and software.
QKD requires a mix of both algorithmic steps, and the randomness of a physical
system. In our case, the randomness of the physical system is obtained through everything
including the random quantum nature of state collapse, and measurement, as well as any
bias within the entire atmospheric channel and optical components; from generation of
single photons to their detection at the passively quenched SPAPD’s. In particular, excess
counts due to the high background during day may contribute to the key in a predictable
way. The algorithm used for EC and PA are assumed to be optimal. Hence, failure of any
of the following randomness tests will be attributed to physical origins, namely the optical
hardware including the detectors, beam splitters, etc. In particular it is important for the
four analyzers as depicted in figure 2.2 to be well aligned for balanced measurements to
result.
Typically, random numbers can be obtained from a random number generator (RNG)
such as a coin toss or, through some deterministic but random process which delivers a
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number satisfying most tests of randomness. They are deterministic, in the sense that
given the same input, the algorithm will produce the same output. Such sources of
randomness are known as pseudo-random number generators (PRNG), and are said to
pass all polynomial time statistical tests if no polynomial time algorithm can distinguish
between a sequence output from the generator and a random sequence, with a probability
of greater than 1/2 [63]. An example is the FIPS 186 algorithm used for DSA or the ANSI
X9.17 generator. The QKD device based on the collapse of the polarization state in a
projection measurement is a random number generator, because it is not deterministic,
relying only on a random physical process. It of course has the added benefit of inherently
distributing the random numbers, while usually random physical processes are localized.
As an example, typical RNG’s devised from a physical system include:
• Johnson noise from a diode or resistor,
• a single photon incident on a half silvered mirror,
• user input through keystrokes or movement of a mouse.
In the following we present tests of randomness on the raw key generated over the
48 hour period presented in this experiment. The tests are applied to the raw key, not
the final key, because the software can act to remove some of the biased behavior of a
RNG. This requires that the raw key be compressed to a final key, the less randomness
in the raw key, the more compression that is required to generate a random final key so
these tests show us as well how much key is lost due to systematic behavior of the QKD
system1. Results of the tests are summarized at the end of this chapter in table 4.3.
Randomness tests are classified as hypothesis or decision tests, and by their nature
are probabilistic, not deterministic. The strength of the test is measured by the p-value
output from the following algorithms and are plotted in blue. The p-value is computed
by comparing the results of a particular statistical test to expected results and testing
1The algorithms for this compression step which was applied in our test, referred to as the privacy
amplification (PA) step, are reported in [62, 64, 57, 65] although other more sophisticated algorithms
have been developed [66, 67].
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how far away the result is from expectations using a χ2 or normal distribution, leading
to a two-sided or one-sided hypothesis test, respectively. Above a threshold for 1% or
p > 0.01, the test is considered true, below it, the test is false. This corresponds to a
significance for the test of 1%, or that in 100 such tests only one random number will
appear to be non-random to the test, giving a confidence or 99%.
The entire two day long key is broken into blocks of various sizes depending on the
test. The first set of tests is performed directly on a single block of key as output from the
software, including the frequency tests, the runs test, approximate entropy, and CUSUM
test, all of which require only ≥ 100 bits of key per test to function appropriately. We
then proceed to fill larger blocks for tests such as the binary matrix rank test, random
excursion tests, or Maurer’s Universal Compression test, requiring larger blocks and longer
test times. Each block represents a sample of the RNG, and the test result is plotted in
time at the beginning of it’s generation during the key exchange. Since each bit should
be unbiased and independent, the block size does not matter outside of the requirements
of a particular algorithm used for testing. Table 4.3 summarizes the test requirements, as
well as their results.
In particular, we also focus on a few short string template matching schemes since
QKD systems frequently suffer from the generation of repetitive short strings, due to for
example after-pulsing or conversely detector saturation, upon the detection of a bit. Such
signatures are common in QKD systems, and need to be detected and corrected for. This
may include balancing the efficiency of detectors, modifying the optical density of the
different paths in the detector analyzer, or correcting for unbalanced polarization effects
in the optical path.
The following results are performed using a package of algorithms available via NIST
at [67, 68]. In the plots, the horizontal axis is time, and the plots shows the p-value which
is the strength of the test, as well as the result of the test. The actual true/false success
of the test is plotted as a 1 for true, and a 0 for false, where a false value means the input
sequence does not satisfy the test statistic of a random number. Since the density of tests
is usually large a moving average on 50 such tests of the decision outcome is plotted,
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Figure 4.5: The Monobit Frequency Test: The p-value and moving average of the decision test.
except for lower density tests which required a large number of input bits. The p-value is
blue point, while the results of the test are in red, where a moving average is applied in
some cases, as specified.
4.3.1 Frequency Tests
Frequency tests probe the ratio of zeros or ones assuming the distribution should be
equal. For example the binary string 111000 will pass a frequency test. This string is not
representative of a random number generator though, and serves and example to illustrate
the need for a variety of tests to achieve confidence in the randomness of the key. In the
next section we will see a string which follows a random looking sequence or runs, may
pass the runs test but still have a large asymmetry in its frequency. Therefore, some
of the following tests, such as the runs test, require that the frequency test has already
validated randomness to be valid. See figure 4.5.
These measurements show a 51.5% asymetry during night, and 54.0% asymetry during
day. The majority of tests are successful, with some asymetry which rises during day.
This is due to the background light incident on a slightly unbalanced set of detectors
in the polarization analysers. Unbalance may be due to an amount of absorption in
either spatial mode of the polarization analysers, for example the waveplate (see figure of
detectors), which can be corrected using a piece of neutral glass or a weak ND filter in the
corresponding arm. Different efficiencies of each detector after the analysers is another
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likely culprit. Dark counts on the detectors are unlikely to contribute a large amount bias
in the key, but may be somewhat responsible when background rates coincide with the
dark counts.
The block frequency test is a frequency test over a block M bits long. For these tests
M=10.











Figure 4.6: Block Frequency Test: The p-value (blue) and a moving average of the result (red).
4.3.2 Runs Tests
The Wolf-Wolfowitz runs test focuses on the number of uninterrupted sequences of iden-
tical bits, or runs, and compares this to the expectation of a random sequence. To be
valid, this test requires that the frequency test is successful. The test in particular will
determine if the oscillation from sequences of 1’s to 0’s is to fast or too slow. For example
a string like 0101010101 oscillates very quickly, while the string 1111100000 is a slow
oscillation. Neither of these strings will pass the runs test. As can be seen in figure 4.7,
most of the key generated passes the runs test.
4.3.3 Binary Matrix Rank Test
The binary matrix rank test checks for independence of given length substrings of the
entire sequence. The rank of the array is compared to the expectation of a random
number to generate the statistic. We use 3× 3 matrices for the test, although other sizes
may be used, this size was recommended in the test suite. This test is performed on
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Figure 4.7: Runs Test: The p-value (blue) and a moving average of the decision test (red).
blocks each of equal length of 50000 bits. The key is being sampled every 100 seconds
from which 50000 bits are drawn out for the test. There may be minimal overlap of the
bits in the blocks at times where key generation is low. Referring to figure 4.8, it can be
seen that the majority of tests using the binary matrix rank test are successful.











Figure 4.8: Binary Matrix Rank Test: The p-value (blue) and moving average of the decision test (red).
4.3.4 Approximate Entropy Test
This test compares the empirical number of adjacent overlapping blocks of bits to the
statistic expected for a random sequence. Another way of looking at the test is to say
it is concerned with the frequency of different patterns in the string. The test has often
been used in comparing time series in biological functions, namely irregular repetitions of
a normal functioning heart beat, but may be applied in randomness test generally. The
principal assumption in generating the test statistic is that a pattern of fluctuations in a
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random process should not be followed by observations of similar patterns of fluctuations
[69]. The test is called with the recommended string partition size of 3, and applied on
each block of key of approximate size 200-400 bits, and figure 4.9 shows that most of the
key is random by the approximate entropy statistic.











Figure 4.9: Approximate Entropy Test: The p-value and moving average of the decision test.
4.3.5 Compression Tests
Compression tests look to compress the random string by encoding patterns with simpler
strings. For a true random number, it should not be possible to find any patterns withing
the string which can be coded in a simpler way. Two such tests are the Maurer’s Universal
Statistical Test and the Lempel-Ziv Complexity Test. Results for the Maurer’s Universal
Statistical Test are presented below. Maurer’s test is considered universal to a wide range
of statistical tests, but depends on the heuristic approximation [70].
The Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test is performed for all of the block sizes, includ-
ing 500, 50000 and 1000000 bits. Figure 4.10 uses the correct number of bits and the
confidence of this test satisfies the setting for the p-value. For an example, a somewhat
low level of bits is input to the Maurer’s Test and is presented in figure 4.11. It is apparent
that the key does not pass the Maurer’s test with as large a p-value when comparing the
smaller number of bits input to it, as can be seen in figures 4.10 and 4.11. This feature of
the test is most prominent during the portion of key generated in rain. In any case, the
majority of tests are successful for randomness.
72











Figure 4.10: Maurer’s Universal Compression Test: The p-value (blue) and moving average of the
decision test (red) for 106 bit blocks.











Figure 4.11: Maurer’s Universal Compression Test: The p-value (blue) and moving average of the
decision test (red) for 5× 104 bit blocks.
4.3.6 Excursions Tests
The purpose of the excursions tests are to compare the resulting key to expectations of a
random walk. A random walk is a studied process with known statistics. A good overview
of the random walk including statistics and expectations of the random excursion can be
found in Chapter 3 of the book by Feller [71]. Using a random key, a random walk
can be easily simulated. In the Random Excursions tests, the sequence coming from the
random number generator is turned into an equal length random walk by equating 0 and
1 with -1 and +1, and then doing a partial sum of the bits along the key while keeping
tally of the result. This will result in a trajectory stepping up or down randomly in equal
measures, in series with the index of the sequence. The random walk has known properties
such as the maximal departure from zero, the number zero crossings which should occur
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for a given length, or the tendency of a walk to trend in one direction for some time, and
mean revert. All of these properties can be used to find statistical tests of the sequence
by assuming the walk is purely random and then observing the differences in behavior.











Figure 4.12: The random excursion test for the first state -4. The test is among the most poorly
performing of the 8 tests, with 19 out of 93 tests giving false outcomes.
There are three tests below which are based on random walk excursions, the CUSUM
test, the random excursions, and random excursions variant tests. Each of these tests
focus on the total number of times the random walk visits a particular state. The ex-
cursion test performs a series of 8 sub-tests based on the number of times a particu-
lar state occurs in the random walk. The states are {−4,−3,−2,−1,+1,+2,+3,+4}.
For example, given the input string 00101101, we would have sums of partial subsets
moving along the sequence, giving a random walk starting from zero, with the result
{−1,−2,−1,−2,−1, 0,−1, 0}. This visits states -1 four times, and -2 twice. The total
number of times the states are visited is compared to the expectation of a random number,
which would give a purely Gaussian random walk.
The random excursions test uses 106 bits, resulting is a series of test for our 48 hours
of key that are mainly indicative of a random number generator. The p-value is based on
the χ2 distribution, or two sided test form. Not all the 8 states are plotted for brevity,
although inspection shows each is similar. Four plots of the best and worst tests are
plotted in figures 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 which are from excursions of the 1st, 2nd, 6th
and 7th states.
The random excursions variant test is similar to the random excursions test, only using
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a larger number of states, here spanning from -9 to +9 and so outputting 18 different tests.
As well, this test does not form a partition of the sequence to look at the number of times
a state is visited in a cycle, but instead considers the number of times the state is visited
in respect to the length of the entire sequence. The test also requires a minimum of 106
bits. Two such tests for states not checked in the original excursions test are plotted in
figure 4.16 and 4.17.
The Cumulative Sums Test (CUMSUM) adjusts the binary digits to be -1 and 1, and
compares the result of the sum of all digits, to the expected result of 0, for a random
walk. In contrast to the random excursions test and random excursions variant test, it is
the maximum cumulative sum for a given length of key is thus tested to fall within the
expected statistic of a random walk in the CUSUM test. It is in the class of excursions
tests, since it compares the statistic of the random walk generated from the key to average
statistical expectation of a real random walk.
The CUSUM test can be considered similar to frequency tests. Should a key generate
to large a number of ones (zeros) then the maximal excursion will be larger than expected
for a true random number, befitting some non-random sequences. Moreover, it may
detect a random number generators tendency to trend by giving many ones followed by
many zeros, in a cyclical manner, which may not show up in a frequency test. As well,
oscillations of the key may in some cases be detected as mean reverting processes (faster
than average) by the test, where the expected maximum state of the random walk is not











Figure 4.13: The random excursion test for the second state, −3, which is true but shows 14 of 93, or
15% tests failed.
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Figure 4.14: The random excursion test for the state +2, which is mainly true but shows some false
tests.











Figure 4.15: The random excursion test for the seventh state, +3, which shows one false test.
reached often enough. The test is applied in the forward cumulative summing mode on
blocks of ≈ 200-400 bits output directly from the QKD system, and it can be seen in
figure 4.18 that the key passes the majority of such tests.
4.3.7 Template Matching Tests
Template matching tests seek to find the number of matches to a specific m-bit long
pattern within a window of particular size n. The input pattern is compared to the
expectation of a random string to generate a statistic. A non-overlapping test differs
from an overlapping test simply in the algorithm. In the overlapping template test if the
pattern is found the algorithm selects the last bit of this pattern to place the beginning
of the new window while it searches for a string. In the Non-overlapping version, the
window moves along without regard to the occurrence of a pattern so that each window
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Figure 4.16: Random Excursions Variant Test for the state −8.











Figure 4.17: Random Excursions Variant Test for the state −4.
in the test is separate from the others. For both these tests many strings are tested so
they are included in the Appendix from figure A.4 to figure A.26.
The template matching test is an important one since it may find small systematic
patterns in the detection hardware. In particular, referring to the BBM92 detector dia-
gram in figure 2.2 we should be concerned with the balance across each detection mode.
There are four modes, each including some polarization optics and a Avalanche Photon
detector. Note that there is some imbalance as the wave plate that sets the measurement
in the ±45◦ basis will lead to more absorption in those two modes. This can be cor-
rected for by adding a plate of glass, or a neutral density filter in the HV modes. Each
Avalanche Photon detector should behave in a similar way. As well, some polarization
effects due to small variations in the geometry of optical elements may be a problem.
Small deviations within the tolerance specified for an optical element, or misalignments
in the detectors may lead to polarizations effects. Finally, the polarization analyzers do
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Figure 4.18: Cumulative Sums Test: The p-value (blue) and moving average of the decision test (red).
not separate polarization perfectly so some photons will go into the wrong ports in a
systematic way.
Refer to figures A.4 to A.26 in the appendix. We see that the raw key has some
systematic patterns in the key. These occur for small bit strings while longer bit string
patterns in the non-overlapping template matching tests, but not for longer strings. The
reverse appear for the overlapping template matching tests, longer strings fail while shorter
ones pass the test for randomness. It would be appropriate to balance the whole set of
detectors especially when extraneous light during the daytime generation of key will lead
to further biases in the bit string. Although for small patterns the tests failed, this is the
key prior to compression. The final key resulting after privacy amplification will likely
pass these randomness tests with a larger p-value. However, to optimize the amount of
key generated, small corrections of the detectors are an important improvement.
4.3.8 Discussion of the random number tests
Although the majority of tests show that the quantum cryptographic device behaves as a
true random number generator, it is clear that the randomness of the key is decreased in
daylight, when a large background incident in the optical channel will lead to erroneous
key generation. This is observed especially at the portion of key when the signal was
attenuated in a rain storm, at 9:00 AM on the first day. In these conditions ηt → 0% and
so r
′
c → ra, so qt → 1/2.
The background in the channel may also serve to bias the efficiency of particular single
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Test Result Minimum bit size Type
Frequency T 100 Normal
Block frequency T 100 χ2
Runs T 100 Normal
Binary Rank T 38912 χ2
Non Overlapping Template Matching F 106 χ2
Overlapping Template Matching T 106 χ2
Maurer’s Universal Compression T 904960 Normal
Approximate Entropy T 100 χ2
CUSUM T 100 Normal
Random Excursions T 106 χ2
Random Excursions Variant T 106 Normal
Table 4.3: Requirements and results of the random number tests.height
photon avalanche photo detectors (there are 4 detectors) leading to a slight asymmetry of
key generation, since the different detectors may have varying saturation behavior. If this
asymmetry is a part of the publicly discussed information it will not affect the security
of the key. The portion of the asymmetry which gives an unbalanced key string will lead
to information leakage to the potential eavesdropper. This is observed in most of the
tests as a drop in the p-value during daytime hours, and can be observed in the monobit





The experiment and the main discoveries of this experiment are summarized here. A short
outlook for improvements to the current QKD system is discussed.
5.1 Final Discussion
This report shows that it is possible to perform QKD with spectrally broad entangled
photon pairs over a free-space optical link in daylight ambient background light conditions.
A combination of temporal, spectral, and spatial filters are adequate to suppress the
background light levels below the level of detector saturation, and below the levels where
accidental coincidence contributions would bring the QBER above the threshold for secure
key distribution. Moreover, we found that filtering only reduced the final daytime key
generation rate in comparison to night time by a small factor; less than 2.
Spectral filters must be carefully matched to the source signal to maximize signal
transmission across the channel and reject the large spectrum of sunlight which is trans-
mitted through the atmosphere. Ideally, the source wavelength should be chosen so that
a strong absorption in the earth’s atmosphere, due to for example water molecules, does
not occur. This could correspond to a Fraunhofer line of the sun or absorption line of the
upper atmosphere, where background light will be at lower levels [72]. Additional filters
may be used outside of the source signal to further reduce counts, but in our case an
average optical density of OD2 was enough to suppress light to reasonable levels, while
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coupling roughly 8 nm spectral bandwidth. Color filters may also be used for reduction
of background by extra densities outside of the signal spectrum. In regards to the choice
of a pair source, the bandwidth may be reduced using longer crystals, in particular peri-
odically poled crystals. This will also allow spectral filtering by larger densities through
the selection of a narrow interference filter.
Spatial filters play an important role in removing stray light which is introduced
into the receiving telescopes by way of multiple reflection in the telescope barrel or the
lens, or just being scattered near the optical ports into the free space channel. Baﬄes
extending both upstream and downstream to the receiving lens proved effective in reducing
extraneous counts from modes outside of the free-space channel. Spatially, most of the
background light coupled into the detectors falls within a small circular area surrounding
the sending ports, namely, the FOV of the receiver. This FOV, including the optical ports,
must be covered in diffuse black out material to reject unwanted scatter of background
light into the free-space optical channel. Limiting the pinhole is an important factor to
reduce the FOV, though a minimum size must be set where it will still be possible to
align the optical channel efficiently.
The temporal filtering can be resolved to a minimum window for accepted counts to
slightly more than the detector jitter. Adjusting for timing delays carefully optimizes
the amount of coincident photons which are accepted into the data processing routine.
As well, synchronization was achieved in the field tests during day. The laboratory tests
found the ratio of total counts to real coincidences of approximately 250 beyond which
synchronization will break down. Thus, with next generation sources, synchronization
should always be possible in daylight conditions.
This opens up the possibility of QKD based on either of the BBM92 and E91 pro-
tocol which uses an entanglement source to operate continuously day and night over a
free space optical channel. Using brighter sources, both larger key generation rates and
further distances are possible. For example, these studies open up the option for 24 hour
communication security using an intra-city QKD system, or possibly satellite based QKD
operating during day, even when an entanglement source is used.
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5.2 Improvements
A longer distance test and higher key rate are both possible. Periodically poled materials
for χ2 sum frequency generation will allow higher spectral filtering of sunlight due to their
narrow bandwidth, may be temperature tuned for signal wavelength selection, and give
higher count rates [48]. This will be an advantage for long distance QKD. Preliminary
measurements for this source were begun while this experiment was run.
Adaptive optics may be used for stabilization to cope with atmospheric turbulence or
thermal expansion of the hardware to improve transmission through the channel. Active
coupling using simple tip and tilt controllers would cope for small mechanical misalign-
ments due to the change in temperature from day and night. Although over short distances
beam wander and spreading can be ignored, distances larger than a few kilometers will
require active stabilization where atmospheric turbulence begins to have a strong effect
on the collimated beam.
A more costly approach would be to use a beam splitter and deformable mirror to
actively couple the signal through a smaller pinhole. This would reduce the background
even further due to spatial filtering. Keep in mind that the Rayleigh range for a longer
distance means the optical ports will be required to be large. It is not clear that daytime
communication to and from geostationary earth orbiting (GEO) and low earth orbiting
(LEO) satellites would be possible, since receiving apertures over these distances need to
be of the order of a meter in diameter, and would collect a large amount of sunlight.
One minor improvement would involve design of a transmissive lens with dichroic
properties. This could work in parallel to the interference filters as a spatial method
to filter spectrally: by having a poor focus for the spectral range outside the signal
bandwidth. This is much like placing a prism in the receiving telescope, but without

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2: Mechanical Draft of the Concentric Baﬄe Mount.
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Figure A.3: Assembly including the Raytracing Wires for the the Receiver Lens, the Receiver Lens,
the Baﬄe Mount, and Concentric Apertures.
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A.2 Template Matching Tests
A.2.1 Non-Overlapping Template matching Tests











Figure A.4: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’001’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.5: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’011’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.6: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’100’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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Figure A.7: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’1000’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.8: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision
test (red) for the pattern ’10101010’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.9: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’00011001’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.10: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision
test (red) for the pattern ’000000001’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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Figure A.11: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’100100100101’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.12: Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red)
for the pattern ’10010010110100101’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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A.2.2 Overlapping Template Matching Tests











Figure A.13: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’01’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.14: Overlapping Template Matching Test: the p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’111’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.15: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’101’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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Figure A.16: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’011’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.17: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’001’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.18: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’0011’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.19: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’0110’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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Figure A.20: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’1001’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.21: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’1110’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.22: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’11011’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.23: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’01110’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.
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Figure A.24: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’010101’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.25: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
the pattern ’1010101’ performed on blocks of 1× 106 bits.











Figure A.26: Overlapping Template Matching Test: The p-value (blue) and the decision test (red) for
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